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COLORISM:

A DARKER SHADE OF PALE

Taunya Lovell Banks

*

In this Article, Professor Banks argues that colorism, skin tone discrimination
against dark-skinned but not light-skinned blacks, constitutes a form of racebased discrimination. Skin tone discrimination coexists with more traditional forms
of race discrimination that impact all blacks without regard to skin tone and
phenotype, yet courts seem unwilling to recognize this point. Professor Banks uses
employment discrimination cases to illustrate some courts' willingness to acknowledge
subtler forms of race-based discrimination, like skin tone discrimination, for
white ethnic and Latina/a plaintiffs, but not for black plaintiffs. The inability of
courts to fashion coherent approaches to colorism claims involving black claimants
means that dark-skinned blacks will continue to experience more extreme forms
of race discrimination than experienced by light-skinned blacks. In addition, failure
to address colorism claims by black litigants will have broader implications as courts
face the more complex racelike cases likely occur in the twenty-first century.
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INTRODUCTION
The sliding scale of color bedeviled everyone, irrespective of where
one stood on the color chart'

As we leave the twentieth century, news commentators repeatedly
2
warn that the United States of the next century will be "a little darker."
They mention the influx of nonwhite migrants from Central and Latin
3
America, sub-Sahara Africa, and Asia as well as the increasing numbers
4
of multi- and biracial individuals and interracial and interethnic marriages.5 At the same time as commentators warn we are becoming a bit darker

1.
PAULI MURRAY, PROUD SHOES: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY 90-91 (1956).
2.
Harry Murphy, Economy to Require Opportunities for Minorities, ATLANTA). & CONST.,
Mar. 16, 1991, at A16 ("[D)emographic studies such as the census demonstrate that the United
States is becoming less white almost by the day .... Not only is America growing ever darker of skin,
but in today's world economy, many of our trading partners are peopled by non-whites."); see aLso
Neil Modie & Scott Maier, Political Clout for Minorities Doesn't Match Population, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 9, 1991, at A1 (showing that the 1990 census data suggests that minority
groups have grown at faster rates than the white population).
Census Bureau projections indicate that the proportions of people of color will increase to
almost half ( 48 percent) by the year 2050 .... The black and indigenous populations will
double, the Hispanic population will triple, and the Asian American population will almost
quadruple over the same time period. In contrast, the non-Hispanic White population will
increase by only 5 percent.
jUANITA TAMAYO LOTI, ASIAN AMERICANS: FROM RACIAL CATEGORIES TO MULTIPLE IDENTITIES 23 (1998).
3.
See Roberto Sura, The Next Wave; How Immigration Blurs the Race Discussion, WASH. POST,
July 19, 1998, at C1 (arguing that Latina/a and Asian immigrants blur the traditional black-white
paradigm).
4.
Although the exact number of multiracial individuals is unknown, estimates of the number
of children "living in families where one parent is white and the other is black, Asian, or American
Indian" have tripled from less than 400,000 in 1970 to 1.5 million in 1990. Lawrence Wright, One
Drop of Blood, NEW YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 49. These estimates do not take into account single
parents or children whose parents are divorced. See generally Jerelyn Eddings & Kenneth T. Walsh,

Counting a 'New' Type of American: The Dicey Politics of Creating a 'Multiracial' Category in the Census,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 14, 1997, at 22 (arguing against recognition of a multiracial census
category).
See Roger Sanjek, Intermarriage and the Future of Races in the United States, in RACE 103
5.
(Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994) (arguing that increased intermarriage in the twentyfirst century will blur traditional racial categories); Michael A. Retcher, Interracial Marriages Eroding
Barriers, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1998, at Al (arguing that increasing rates of interracial marriages
may cause race to lose much of its meaning); Orlando Patterson, Race Over, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 10,
2000, at 6 (arguing that increased immigration from Asia, Central and Latin America, and the
Caribbean, coupled with an increase in interracial and interethnic marriage, will eliminate race as
a problem in the twenty-first century as racial boundaries blur).
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6

as a nation, racial conservatives, other politicians/ and courts push for color8
blind laws.
There is continuing disagreement over how the government should treat
9
socially constructed differences like "race." Proponents of a colorblind society
6.
See, e.g., Robert Marguand, HourofTruthfar Affirmative Action, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Aug. 28, 1997, at 1. "Some conservatives argue that an emphasis on race-based remedies is itself
divisive and contributes to, rather than cures, racial problems." ld.
7.
See, e.g., William Goldschlag, High Court Limits Affirmative Action, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
June 13, 1995, at 6; Center far New Black Leadership Decries Piscataway Affirmative Action Case Bribe:
A New Low far 'Civil Rights' Organization, P.R. Newswire, Nov. 21, 1997; Crossfire (CNN television
broadcast, July 17, 1990), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript File, transcript #97 (discussing
the Civil Rights Act of 1990).
8.
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny test
to affirmative action programs); Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 109 (1989) (city minority set aside
program); Wygant v. Jackson Bel. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoff and seniority program).
9.
I use the term "race" in quotation marks to remind the reader that race is not only socially
constructed, but laden with such heavy baggage that the word "race" should never be used except in
quotation marks. See Wright, supra note 4, at 50; see also Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction
of Race: Same Observations on !Uusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994)
(defining races as groupings of people based loosely on historical, social, ancestral, and physical
components). ian F. Haney L6pez argues that
race must be understood as a sui generis social phenomenon in which contested systems of
meaning serve as the connections between physical features, races, and personal
characteristics .... Race is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing,
contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject to the macro forces of social and political
struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions.
ld. at 7. Contemporary discussions of race and racial formation in the United States generally
concede that racial categories are socially constructed. As Michael Omi and Howard Winant point
out, "[f]rom the very inception of the Republic to the present moment, race has been a profound
determinant of one's political rights, one's location in the labor market, and indeed one's sense of
'identity."' MICHAEL OM! & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960STOTHE 1990s 1 (1994); see also, HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL CONDITIONS 13-21
(1994). This view is consistent with the commonly accepted belief within the scholarly community,
and, increasingly, with general public opinion. Popular magazines like Newsweek announce that "race
is a mere 'social construct'-a gamy mixture of prejudice, superstition and myth." Tom Morganthau,
What Color Is Black? NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 64 (describing the belief of most scientists, but not
the general public). Ten years ago, even the Supreme Court recognized that legal definitions of
racial categories change over time. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 (1987).
The notion that race is an objective condition assumes that racial definitions are constant, although
periodic adjustments and reclassifications might be necessary. In contrast, the notion that race is
subjective, an ideological or social construct, assumes that racial meanings are contextual and fluid.
Race is used constantly as a signifier, but racial meanings constantly change. Thus, racial identities
are unstable, and race has no meaning except that ascribed to it. Racial identities are being created
and recreated everyday. Leslie Espinoza and Angela Harris write:
This is the problem of race. lt is both easily knowable and an illusion. It is obviously about
color and yet not about color. It is about ancestry and bloodlines and not about ancestry
and bloodlines. It is about cultural histories and not about cultural histories. It is about
language and not about language. We strive to have a knowable, systematic explanation for
race. We struggle with its elusivity. We name our categories, we refine our categories, and
then inevitably we find too many exceptions to the categories, too many people who just do
not fit. Race should be rational and it is not.
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oppose providing rights or privileges to any group based on race, and some
would abolish racial categories altogether. Arguments for a colorblind society
assume that the abolition of or a deemphasis on race and racial categories
will lead to the creation of a society in which race confers no special rights or
privileges. Ignored in the debate about the merits of a colorblind society is the
impact of markers like skin tone and phenotypical characteristics on the eco11
nomic fortunes of individuals raced as nonwhite.
12
Skin tone, for example, may sometimes mediate how "black" people
are racialized in the United States. In 1997, the television show Nightline aired
Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory and the Sticky
Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1609-10 (1997) (discussing the tension between scholars who
reject the black-white paradigm and those who believe in "black exceptionalism").
10.
See, e.g., CLINT BOLICK, THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FRAUD: CAN WE RESTORE THE
AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS VISION? (1996) (arguing that affirmative action programs should be based
on class rather than on race); TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR
COLORBLIND jUSTICE (1996) (arguing that affirmative action programs run counter to the nation's
ideals and prevent fair treatment of all citizens); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY:
CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996) (arguing that affirmative action programs should
be based on class rather than on race). But cf. BARBARA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ( 1996) (arguing that affirmative action programs are necessary components of antiracism
and antisexism).
11.
I use "race" as a verb here and in other places in this essay to remind readers that race in
the United States is often imposed on some groups of people.
12.
I consciously use the term "black" throughout this article rather then the more current
"African American". As historian Armstead Robinson said:
The widespread adoption of the more currently fashionable term, AfricanAmerican, resulted from the powerful influence of the media upon American
society rather than from a consensus within the black community. In the
1960s, the black power movement inaugurated a period of intensive discussion
which resulted in widespread acceptance of terms such as black and AfroAmerican. These terms earned validity by surviving sustained debate in a veritable cauldron of public discussion. In contrast, the newer term African-American
has been adopted all too easily even though a broad cross-section of blacks
object strongly though in resigned silence to this term, some out of respect for
the distinctiveness of Africa. For after all, the term African-American precludes
the possibility of a distinctive term for the native African who has become an
American citizen.
Armstead Robinson, Introduction, in Afro-American Landmarks in Virginia (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In this Article, I use the terms "black" and "Afro-American" to refer to
people of African descent. I use the term Afro-American to distinguish native-born from foreign
black people. As Professor Robinson suggests, what we call ourselves is a political act that expresses
our identity and culture. The name we call ourselves has been a constant source of friction within
the black community. See, e.g., Bettye Collier-Thomas & James Turner, Race, Class and Color:
The African American Discourse on Identity, 14 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 5 (1994) (discussing the
history of racial designation of blacks and the connection between color and class in self-identification).
I chose to use the term black as a generic term for persons of African descent in this country because
its popularization during the 1960s marked a conscious effort by black intellectuals, artists, and
student activists to find a name that both demonstrated class unity and discouraged intraracial colorism.
See id. at 24-25. For a more detailed discussion of the views of legal scholars on this point, see Alex
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a program entitled "America in Black and White-Shades of Prejudice"
that briefly explored what the program's host, Ted Koppel, described as "a
strong perception [within the African American community) that ... in
America ... lighter skinned blacks have a [sic] easier time and are more likely
to succeed than darker skinned blacks." 13 The Nightline program suggested
that colorism, discrimination based on skin tone, has a significant economic
14
impact on dark-skinned blacks.
Sometimes very light-skinned blacks benefit economically as compared
to dark-skinned blacks because they are not readily identified by potential
employers as black. Law professor Cheryl Harris writes about her grandmother,
a light-skinned "black" woman, who used her white skin to secure a better
15
paying job to support her family. By passing for white, hiding her nonwhite
ancestry, and capitalizing on her European physical features, Harris's grandmother improved her economic situation. Professor Harris uses this story to
illustrate how her grandmother's skin color served as a proxy for race, concluding
that whites continue to have a property interest in their white skin because
16
it confers certain economic privileges denied to those whose skin is not white.
Yet, Harris's example demonstrates implicitly that a few light-skinned blacks
17
also received similar privileges. Even today, blacks with light brown skin
M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect To Prevent Integration: DestabUlizing Race as a Vehicle
to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1596 n.8 (1995); and Johnny Washington,
'Black' or 'African American': What's in a Name?, in AMERICAN MOSAIC: SELECTED READINGS ON
AMERICA'S MULTICULTURAL HERITAGE 57 (Yong I. Song & Eugene C. Kim eds., 1993).
13.
Nightline: America in Black and White-Shades of Prejudice (ABC television broadcast,
Feb. 28, 1997), available in LEXIS/News Library, Transcript #97022801-j07 [hereinafter Nightline].
14.
See id. News commentator Michel Queen reported on Nightline that dark-skinned blacks
experience less success in the fashion industry than light-skinned blacks, and on average earn substantially less than light-skinned blacks. I discuss studies substantiating this point in Part I of this
Article.
15.
See Cheryl!. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1710 (1993).
See id. at 1713.
16.
17.
Even though the circumstances Professor Cheryl Harris describes occurred a long time
ago, there are more contemporary examples of racial passing by light-skinned persons raced as black.
Ohio Law School Dean and Professor Gregory Williams wrote about his light-skinned black father
passing for white in Virginia to support his family in the 1940s. See GREGORY HOWARD
WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE
WAS BLACK (1995). When singer Mariah Carey's first album debuted in 1990, the New York
Times touted her as a 20-year old white soul singer. See Stephen Holden, Recordings: Three Voices
and the Dangers of Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1990, § 2, at 22. A year later, Stephen Holden
wrote, without classifying Carey racially, that "her father, an aeronautical engineer, is black and
Venezuelan. Her mother ... is of Irish descent." Stephen Holden, The Pop-Gospel According to
Mariah Carey, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at§ 2, at 28. The same year, another article in the New
York Times characterized Carey as a mulatto, the product of a interracial marriage. See Gail Lumet
Buckley, When a Kiss Is Not Just a Kiss, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1991, at § 2, at 1. It is unclear
whether Mariah Carey in 1990 was actively or passively passing for white or whether she selfidentified as white or non black. Racial self-identification is made difficult by externally constructed
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tones, although clearly identified as black, may have some economic advantage over blacks with darker skin tones, especially in workplace settings.
18
Just as critical studies scholars write that there are degrees of whiteness,
in this Article I argue that there are degrees or layers of blackness. Yet, the
traditionally paradigmatic instance of race discrimination in America is discrimination by a member of one racialized group against a person from a different racialized group (interracial discrimination). The traditional paradigm
operates even when the alleged basis for discrimination is not race, but rather
ethnicity, nationality, or color. Courts typically treat these latter categories as
proxies for race.
More recently, the traditional American race discrimination paradigm
has come under sustained challenge in cases brought by white ethnics and
19
Latinas/os against members of their own race. In these cases, courts sometimes view ethnicity or color as a proxy for race. These same courts have
been more reluctant to dissociate color from race in the context of cases
20
brought by blacks. Therefore, I argue in this Article that U.S. courts rigidly
adhere to the commonly accepted notion that a person with any known
21
African ancestry is raced as black. An overwhelming majority of people
raced as black in the United States, however, have mixed ancestry and vary

notions of race. Adrian Piper, for example, also the light-skinned offspring of an interracial marriage,
asserts that she passes for black because that is how she is constructed in the United States.
Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, in PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY 244
(Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., 1996). For a discussion on racial passing and the importance of skin tone
and phenotype in establishing race, see Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: "Passing" Revisited
and Demystification as a Critical Practice, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 297 (2000) (arguing that authentic
whiteness in law is constructed as racial purity).
18.
See e.g., THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE (1994 & 1997)
(arguing that class struggle rather than some "natural" antagonism resulted in the racial oppression
of enslaved laborers brought from Africa); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE V ANJSHING jEW: [N
SEARCH OF jEWISH IDENTITY FOR THE NEXT CENTURY ( 1998) (arguing that the American Jewish
culture may vanish as American Jewry becomes more assimilated into the dominant culture); NOEL
[GNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995) (arguing that Irish Catholic immigrants used
the church, labor unions, and the Democratic Party to gain acceptance as whites in America);
DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKING CLASS (1991) (examining how the white community defines itself and how it defines
other groups).
19.
See discussion infra Part II.
See id.
20.
21.
See F. )AMES DAVIS, WHO [S BLACK: ONE NATION'S DEFINITION 4-6 (1991). "The
nation's answer to the question: 'Who is black?' has long been that a black is any person with any
known African black ancestry." ld. at 5 (citing BREWTON BERRY & HENRY L. TISCHLER, RACE
AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 97-98 (4th ed. 1978); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
113-18 (1944); JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATTOES IN THE
UNITED STATES 1-2 (1980)).
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widely both in skin tone and phenotypical characteristics. Only in the
United States is the racial category "black" constructed in a way that heightens
23
the stigma of inferiority imposed on African ancestry. African ancestry
trumps all other racial markers.
In practice, however, differences in skin tone and phenotype among
black people do have meaning in the United States, especially for blacks
with the darkest skin tones and the least European phenotypes. Social
science studies indicate that blacks and whites, and perhaps other nonwhites,
24
distinguish among blacks based on skin tone. Yet, the government's defi25
nition of the racial category black impedes recognition by courts that black
people can be differentially racialized. To the extent that discrimination laws
seek to address impermissible treatment based on membership in a different
racialized group, the reluctance of courts to view shades of color as a
relevant criterion in discrimination claims by and against blacks is ill
founded.
The need for courts to pay attention to discrimination based on skin tone
and phenotype is heightened by the changing demographics of American
society. In the twenty-first century, discrimination cases are less likely to be
of the traditional transracial type and more likely to be about gradations in

22.
See DAVIS, supra note 21, at 21 ("At least three-fourths of all people defined as
American blacks have some white ancestry, and some estimates run well above 90 percent."); IAN
F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCfiON OF RACE 180 (1996) (estimating
that black Americans get 25 percent of their genes from white sources); Stephen H. Caldwell &
Rebecca Popenoe, Perceptions and Misperceptions of Skin Color, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 614,
615 (1995) ("As for the African-American population in the United States, geneticist Luigi
Cavalli-Sforza has estimated that 30% of their genes derive from 'white' sources.").
23. · The United States is the only country in the world to apply the rule of hypodescent to
persons with African ancestry. See DAVIS, supra note 21, at 13. For example, "Latin American
countries generally count as black only unmixed African blacks, those only slightly mixed, and
the very poorest mulattoes." ld. at 11. "Under the Northwest European variant, full assimilation
may occur when the mixed person has known black ancestry but appears white." Id. at 119. For a
more complete discussion of this point, see generally id. at 81-122. Ariela Gross points out,
however, that the hypodescent rule is only 130 years old, as demonstrated by litigation during the
antebellum period over who was white and who was black. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness:
Trial of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 114-19 (1998).
24.
See discussion infra Part I. B.
25.
See Directive No. 15, Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistical and Administrative
Reporting, 43 FED. REG. 19,269, 19,269 (1978). Directive No. 15 defines as black "[a) person
having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa." Id. For the 2000 census, the definition
of a black person remains unchanged, however: the black category is now called "black" or
"African-American." See Steven A. Holmes, People Can Claim One or More Races on Federal
Forms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997, at Al.
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physical characteristics among members of ostensibly the same racialized
26
group. This Article examines the differential treatment of skin tone discrimi26.
Some commentators who favor retention of racial categories argue for broadening the
government-sanctioned categories to include multi- and biracial individuals as a way of diluting
the effect of rigid racial categories. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Payson, Check One Box: Reconsidering
Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed-Raced People, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1290 (1996)
(promoting a multiracial category as a step toward "dismantling the dividing lines of race"); Deborah
Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not}ust Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957,
960, 988 (1995) (rejecting a colorblind approach as unacceptable in favor of a multiracial category
which helps avoid racial balkanization). Deborah Ramirez argues that a shift away from monolithic
categories to multicultural ones would "debunk racial stereotypes, as race becomes a multifaceted
concept." Jd. at 986-87. She also notes that "multicultural empowerment facilitates trans-racial
coalitions not only among minority groups of color, but also between minority and non-minority
populations." Id. at 988.
The debates about race and racial categories suggest that the United States is moving away
from its traditional rigid definition of who is black toward a more Latin American notion of race.
Although most Latinas/os have European white, black African, and Native American ancestors,
only a small percentage consider themselves black, usually very dark-skinned Latinas/os with physical
characteristics most often attributed to people of African descent. For a discussion of this point,
see Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer
Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75
DENVER U. L. REV. 131, 146-53 (1997) (arguing that there is a specific antiblack bias). In Latin
America, skin tone and phenotype combine with socioeconomic status to determine the racial
status of persons not clearly marked as white. See, e.g., CARL DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR
WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES 98-112, 226
(1971) (describing a color caste hierarchy in Brazil with privileged whites at the top, persons of mixed
ancestry in the middle, and dark-skinned blacks at the bottom); Tanya Kater( Hernandez, The
Construction of Race and Class Buffers in the Structure of Immigration Controls and Laws, 76 OR. L.
REV. 731, 737 n.26 (1997) (arguing that Congress's conclusion that Puerto Ricans were primarily
white was based on faulty census data which reflected "the proclivity for Latin Americans to claim
whiteness as identity of status regardless of actual African ancestry"); Sebastian Rotella, Blacks
Making Themselves Heard, BALTIMORE SUN, May 2, 1998, at 2A (describing the reemergence of
black consciousness in Latin America).
Several legal commentators, however, warn of the danger to racially subordinated groups, like
blacks, in any widespread adoption of colorblind laws or expansion of racial categories. Tanya
Hernandez, looking at both Brazil and Cuba, warns of the dangers inherent in adopting the Latin
American approach to race. See Tanya Kater( Hernandez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in
an Era of Color-Blind jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 121-22 (1998) [hereinafter Hernandez,
"Multiracial" Discourse] (discussing racism in Brazil directed at persons of African descent); Tanya Kater(
Hernandez, An Exploration of the Efficacy of Class-Based Approaches to Racial Justice: The Cuban
Context (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that the failure of socialist Cuba to
eliminate racial discrimination through colorblind socioeconomic redistribution programs suggests that
substituting class-based affirmative action for race-based programs in the United States will be similarly
unsuccessful). Some Latin American countries deny that race has any significance. See DEGLER, supra,
at 98-112 (questioning claims that class, not race, keeps blacks in Brazil at the bottom of the
socioeconomic ladder); Rorestan Fernandes, The Negro Problem in a Class Society, 1951-60, in 2
BLACKNESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SOCIAL DYNAMICS AND CULTURAL
TRANSFORMATIONS 102 (Arlene Torres & Norman E. Whitten, Jr. eds., 1998); Arlen Torres, La Gran

Familia Puertorriqueiia "Ej Prieta de Beida" (The Great Puerto Rican Family Is Really Really Black), in
BLACKNESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SOCIAL DYNAMICS AND CULTURAL
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra, at 285. But cf. Angel R. Oquendo, Re-Imagining the Latina/a Race, 12
HARV. BLACKLEITERJ. 93, 102 (1995) (arguing that the black-white racial paradigm in the United
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nation in the context of employment discrimination claims to determine
whether race is any more or less socially constructed in one case than in the
other.
In this Article, I suggest that colorism, skin tone discrimination against
dark-skinned but not light-skinned blacks, constitutes a form of race-based
discrimination. Skin tone discrimination coexists with more traditional forms
of race discrimination that affect all blacks without regard to skin tone and
phenotype. I use employment discrimination cases to illustrate the willingness
of the courts to acknowledge more subtle forms of race-based discrimination for
white ethnics and Latinas/os, and the inability of the courts to fashion a
coherent approach to colorism claims involving black claimants.
In Part I, I discuss the origins of colorism practices affecting black Americans, concluding that there is a strong connection between the perception of
light-skinned privilege and notions of white superiority. Then I examine
studies of colorism, concluding that the perception within the black community that light-skinned blacks get economic preference over dark-skinned
blacks has some empirical support. Given the empirical evidence that light
skin can be a source of privilege for black Americans, Part II examines courts'
treatment of colorism claims, concluding that most courts are more willing to
acknowledge racelike discrimination against ethnic whites and Latinas/os than
against black claimants. Part III discusses one case in which a court adopted a
more realistic analytical approach to a colorism claim.
In Part IV, I argue that despite our recognition that race in America
involves a complex bundle of factors including ancestry, phenotype, hair texture, and language, skin tone remains a primary determinant of racial status for
persons of African descent. As a result, there are no simple solutions to the
problem of colorism. Nevertheless, courts already have the basic jurisprudence
to address some colorism claims brought by black litigants and must be prepared
for the more complex claims they are likely to confront in the twenty-first
century.

I.
A.

COLORISM: TRUTH OR FICTION?

Origins of Colorism Practices

In 1986, Tracy Walker, a black clerk-typist in the Atlanta office of the
27
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), was terminated. Her supervisor, another
black woman, wrote that Walker had an "attitude problem" and was late for
States leads Latinas/os to deny "any connection or kinship to blacks" because of the hypodescent rule). See
generally NO LoNGER INVISIBLE: AFRO-LATIN AMERICANS TODAY (Minority Rights Grouped., 1995).
27.

See Walker v. Secretary of the Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403, 404 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
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work, lazy, and incompetent. Tracy Walker filed an employment discrimination suit against the IRS, alleging that these reasons were fabricated and
attributing her termination to the hostility of Ruby Lewis, her dark-skinned
29
black supervisor. Her allegation amounted to the assertion that Lewis disliked Walker because of her light skin tone.
The IRS argued that Walker's claim should be dismissed because "color"
as used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was synonymous with
30
"race." Because both Walker and her supervisor were black, the IRS asserted,
there could be no race claim. The federal trial judge rejected this argument
and refused to dismiss the lawsuit even though Walker was unable to prove
directly that Lewis disliked light-skinned blacks. Instead, the judge wrote:
"[t]here is evidence that Ms. Lewis might have harbored resentful feelings
towards white people, and therefore by inference, possibly towards light31
skinned black people."
The alleged basis for dispute between Walker and Lewis, skin tone bias,
32
would not surprise most black people. Rooted in slavery, the exact origin
of colorism within the black community is unclear. Light-skinned prefer33
ences within that community undoubtedly mirrored white sentiments. The
34
ruling in Walker v. Secretary of the Treasury seems to support claims of light35
skinned color bias. Because of her light skin color, Walker became a surrogate white woman in the eyes of the law.
36
The scholarly and popular literature regarding the "mulatto," from the
end of the Reconstruction era to the first World War, reflected and fostered
color bias within the white community.
Whites tended to view mulattoes as more intelligent than blacks but
not the equal of Caucasians .... [and believed that b)ecause
mulattoes were intellectually superior to blacks, with whom they were
28.
See id.
29.
See id.
30.
See id. at 405.
31.
Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added). Tracy Walker ultimately lost her case after a trial on the
merits. See Walker v. Secretary of the Treasury, 742 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1990), affd, 953 F.2d
650 (11th Cir. 1992).
32.
See Collier-Thomas & Turner, supra note 12, at 11. Some slave owners placed a higher
economic value on slaves of mixed ancestry. This difference in value may well have been job-specific.
Some evidence exists that dark blacks were preferred as field workers because white planters believed
mixed-race slaves were physically weaker and more likely to stir up rebellion.
33.
See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
34.
742 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1990), affd, 953 F.2d 650 (11th Cir. 1992).
35.
See infra notes 37-39, 51-58 and accompanying text.
36.
As Professor Judy Scales-Trent points out, "mulatto" also is a problematic term. It is a
derivative "from the Spanish 'mulato,' young mule"-a sterile hybrid. Judy Scales-Trent, On
Being Like a Mule, in NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY 99-100
(1995).
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racially grouped, they were leaders in every line of acttvtty
undertaken by Negroes .... whites [also] believed that 'mixed bloods'
37
were hybrids, morally weak, and physically degenerate.

Some historians also speculate that after the end of slavery many lightskinned blacks, because they had accumulated more skills, had an economic
38
advantage over dark-skinned blacks.
Critics, often dark-skinned blacks,
complained about "blue veinism," the attempt to establish "pluralistic elites
within the [black] community where the degree of acceptance was granted
in accordance with one's approximation to the dominant 'psychomatic norm
39
images."' This colorphobia within the black community increased with the
40
advent of Jim Crow laws near the end of the nineteenth century. The black
community internalized this colorphobia in ways that subordinated some
group members to others.
Michael Omi argues that members of a racially subordinated group may
be "differentially racialized," creating different levels of status and power
within the group. 41 In-group colorism, the preference for light-skinned blacks,
within the black community is an example of Omi's point. Colorism within
the black community is often blamed solely on a dominant culture that significantly influences how the different tiers of status and power are constructed
and maintained within the black community.
37.
WILLARD B. GATEWOOD, ARISTOCRATS OF COLOR: THE BLACK ELITE, 1880-1920,
at 150 (1990). Whites also believed that mulattos "were 'stirrers-up of strife,' constantly demanding
greater rights and privileges for themselves and awakening false aspirations among the black
masses." Id. Between 1910 and 1920, eugenicists published many articles asserting that there was a
correlation between success of certain black people and "their possession of White blood." Hernandez,
"Multiracial" Discourse, supra note 26, at 128 n.160 (citing, as an example, E.B. Reuter, The
Superiority of the Mulatto, 23 AM.]. Soc. 83, 87 (1917) ("The most simple and obvious means of
accounting for the observed superiority of the mulattoes is to deny the equality of the parent races
and to attribute the superiority of the mixed-blood individuals to the fact of a superior racial
heredity.")).
38.
As two scholars have noted:
[A]ll too often the off-spring of miscegenation on the plantation were more likely to
have been manumitted, given property, some money and provisions for education, all of
which accrued to them a distinct social advantage over other that continued after
slavery. This meant that the light complexioned sectors of the slave population were in
a better position to assume leadership in the economic, social and political life of Black
America.
Collier-Thomas & Turner, supra note 12, at 13. "The syndrome reproduce[d] itself over
generations." Id.
39.
G. Reginald Daniel, Passers and Pluralists: Subverting the Racial Divide, in RACIALLY
MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 95 (Maria P.P. Rooted., 1992).
40.
See GATEWOOD, supra note 37, at 153-54.
41.
Michael Omi, Out of the Melting Pot and Into the Fire: Race Relations Policy, in THE
STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA 207 (1993) (describing differential racialization along class
lines); see also WINANT, supra note 9, at 62-64 (describing differential racialization along class lines
within the post-civil rights African American community).
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Eric Yamamoto argues, however, that in some ways racially subordinated groups "contribute to and are responsible for the construction of their
42
own identities and sometimes oppressive inter-group relations." He explores
the interracial conflicts in Hawaii between two racially subordinated groups,
Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians. Yamamoto argues that Asian
Americans contribute to the racial subordination of Native Hawaiians. He
concludes that racially subordinated groups may redeploy structures of racial
43
oppression against others. Thus, a racialized group can simultaneously be
subordinated and a subordinator of others. "The positional shift is significant
because it decenters 'whiteness' as the singular referent for determining
racial group identities and relations. It expands racial formation and racial
justice inquiries into the realm of interracial relations." 44
Yamamoto argues that the differential racialization of Asian Americans
45
and indigenous people in Hawaii contributes to intergroup conflict. Taking his analysis a step further, I am arguing that the concept of "simultaneity"
also applies to situations in which some members of racially subordinated
groups like blacks redeploy structures of oppression like colorphobia against
other members. In-group colorism reflects not only the ways in which whites
sometimes distinguish among blacks but also the ways in which the racially
subordinated black community internalizes white attitudes toward lightskinned blacks by simultaneously subordinating dark-skinned blacks. In
drawing social and economic distinctions within the black community based
on skin tone and phenotype, blacks thus redeploy one structure of racial
oppression against other blacks. Troublesome as internalized colorism may
be, however, studies suggest that greater economic consequences attach when
members of the dominant culture practice colorism in the hiring and promo46
tion of blacks.
If light-skinned blacks gain some privilege based on their skin tone,
47
their head start arguably translates into a kind of social capital. That is, by
42.
Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3
UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33,38 (1995).
43.
See id. at 47-50.
· 44.
Id. at 45.
45.
See id. at 59-60.
46.
See infra notes 53 and 66 and accompanying text.
4 7.
I thank my colleague Robert Suggs for suggesting this term. He defines it as "'a resource
that: (1) facilitates production; (2) is neither consumed nor otherwise used up in production; and
(3) is derived from ordinarily informal relationships established for non-economic purposes but with
economic consequences."' Robert E. Suggs, Bringing Small Business Development to Urban Neighborhoods, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 487, 489 n.ll (1995) (quoting James S. Coleman, A Rational
Choice Perspective on Economic Sociology, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 166,
175-76 (Niel J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994)). My use of this term, however, differs
slightly from his. The social capital light-skinned black people gain by virtue of skin color facilitates
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virtue of their skin tone, which suggests kinship with and proximity to
48
whites, light-skinned blacks may have access to resources that racial barriers
49
usually deny to blacks as a group. Professor Cheryl Harris's light-skinned
production only indirectly and is not always derived from noneconomic informal relationships. I use
"social capital" to refer to a resource "characterized by the creation and maintenance of social
networks and bonds that facilitate actions and relations. For discussions of the social capital concept,
see James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc. S95 (1988).
See also GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION ( 2d ed. 1980).
48.
Here I mean people classified as black whose physical features, including skin tone, look
more European than African, but whose parents are classified as black. See, e.g., Scales-Trent,
supra note 36.
Wall v. Oyster, 36 App. D.C. 50 (1910), decided almost a century ago, illustrates that
49.
the social capital conferred by light skin has limitations. It may ease, but does not eliminate, racebased discrimination. Isabel Wall, the granddaughter of a prominent Washington, D.C. "aristocrat
of color" family, was removed from a segregated public school for whites because the principal
determined that she was a "colored child." Her maternal grandparents were white, her paternal
great-grandparents were a white man and a very light mulatto woman; and her paternal grandparents were a son of these grandparents and a white woman. See id. at 51.
The trial judge described Isabel as "white" in personal appearance and acknowledged that
neighbors and friends treated and recognized her as white. See id. at 51-52. The court, however,
after noting that the District of Columbia statute requiring separation of the "races" in public schools
contained no definition of the word "colored," concluded that "race" is not determined based on
skin color alone. Skin color simply serves as "one avenue for the conveyance of information upon
the subject of racial identity to the mind of the investigator." Id. at 55.
Other factors here seem to have included the physical appearance of the child's father ("while
of light complexion, [he) presents to the eye racial characteristics which identify him of negro
blood"); the social associations of the child's grandfather-mainly with "colored" people; and the
popular meaning of the term "colored." ld. at 52-53, 58. The court concluded that, in the
United States, the word "colored," when used to designate race, "means a person of negro blood,
pure or mixed; and ... applies no matter what may be the proportions of the admixture, so long as
the negro blood is traceable." ld at 58 (emphasis added).
Mary Church Terrell, a prominent black civic leader, supported the Walls' lawsuit, arguing
publicly that Isabel Wall was white because her mother was white, and the condition of the child
followed the mother. In private, however, Terrell said that "the child [should be) classified as white
to escape 'the hardships, humiliations and injustices' suffered by those 'classified as colored' in 'a
prejudice-ridden city' like Washington." GATEWOOD, supra note 37, at 166. Terrell's argument
refers to the rule applied in most slave-holding states during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early
nineteenth centuries, that the legal status of a black child's mother determined whether the child
was born free or enslaved. See, e.g., EDMUNDS. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY AMERICAN FREED:
THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 335-36 (1975). Terrell's public and private comments
about Wall illustrate perceptions within the black community of the value of light skin and whiteness in general. After losing the legal battle, the Walls quietly moved to another section of
Washington, D.C., where father and daughter "passed" as white. Using an assumed name, Isabel
was enrolled in a school for white students. See GATEWOOD, supra note 37, at 167.
The claim advanced by the plaintiffs in Wall sounds like the claims of multiracial individuals
today. Like some parents of these individuals, Isabel Wall's father believed that she should benefit
in ways dark-skinned children similarly classified as black could not, based on her white ancestry,
her skin color, and her European phenotype. In connection with the census, the federal government
issues directives aimed at standardizing racial categories for use in connection with the census and
other purposes. These racial categories are used by both the public and private sectors. The definitions have changed over the years, and the most recent definitions do not include a multiracial
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grandmother, who passed as white to get a job reserved for white women, is a
more extreme example of the social capital conferred on blacks with light
50
skin. Not only anecdotal but also social scientific evidence supports the view
that light skin is a source of social capital for some blacks.
B.

Studies of Colorism

Social science research confirms that light-skinned blacks are evaluated
more positively than their dark-skinned counterparts in a variety of social
51
situations. In the 1950s, black social scientist E. Franklin Frazier wrote, in
a controversial study of the black middle class, that light-skinned blacks led a
52
more privileged existence than dark-skinned blacks. Frazier's beliefs reflected
the findings of several studies that
in past generations, higher-status blacks tended to have lighter skin
tones than lower-status blacks and that light skin tone was an important criterion for attaining prestige within the black community.
According to these studies, the dominant white society had historically
extended social and economic privileges, not available to darker

category. The push by multiracial groups for this category resulted in several congressional hearings
at which proponents of this additional category claim argued that multiracial people are unfairly
forced to choose among racial communities rather than being allowed to acknowledge their mixed
ancestries. See Hernandez, "Multiracial" Discourse, supra note 26, at 98 n.2, 99 n.9, 106 n.42.
50.
See Harris, supra note 15, at 1710, 1713.
See, e.g., Howard E. Freeman et al., Color Gradation and Attitudes Among Middle-Income
51.
Negroes, 31 AM. SOC. REV. 365 (1966); Darlene Powell- Hopson & Derek S. Hopson, Implications
of Doll Color Preferences Among Blnck Preschool Children and White Preschool Children, 14 J. BLACK
PSYCHOL. 57 (1988); Edward H. Ransford, Skin Color, Life Chances, and Anti-White Attitudes, 18
Soc. PROBS. 164 (1970); Nayda Terkildsen, When White Voters Evaluate Blnck Candidates: The
Processing Implications of Candidates Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring, 3 7 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1032, 1034 (1993) (citing ST. CLAIR DRAKE & HORACE R. CLAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS
(1962)).
52.
Franklin Frazier, in explaining the systematic demagogory touting black inferiority,
writes:
Since the Negro's black skin was a sign of the curse of God and of his inferiority to the white
man, therefore a light complexion resulting from racial mixture raised a mulatto above
the level of the unmixed Negro. Although mulattoes were not always treated better than
the blacks, as a rule they were taken into the household or were apprenticed to a skilled
artisan. Partly because of the differential treatment accorded the mulattoes, but more
especially because of general degradation of the Negro as a human being, the Negro of
mixed ancestry thought of himself as being superior to the unmixed Negro. His light
complexion became his most precious possession.
E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, BLACK BURGEOISIE 135 (1957). Skin color, however, did not overcome the
stigma of race. Frazier continues, "[i)n some parts of the South [mulattoes) constituted a sort of lower
caste, since no matter how well [off] they might be economically, they always bore the stigma of
Negro ancestry." Id. at 137. Frazier "viewed color as an indication of ... opportunity, acculturation,
education, and wealth." GATEWOOD, supra note 37, at 149 (citing FRAZIER, supra, at 405-06).
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blacks, to light-skinned blacks .... [As a result,] the most successful
3
blacks were disproportionately lighter in complexion. 5

Frazier's conclusions mirrored the findings of the Swedish economist
Gunnar Myrdal. In 1944, Myrdal wrote in his pathbreaking study of black
Americans that "[w]ithout a doubt a Negro with light skin and other European
features has in the North an advantage with white people when competing for
54
jobs available to Negroes." Myrdal concluded, however, that the "actual
55
quantitative correlation between class and color is not known."
Contemporary studies question whether skin tone continues to influence
life chances in the black community. A study conducted in the early 1980s
by Verna Keith and Cedric Herring suggested that things did not change
56
between the pre-civil rights 1950s and the post-civil rights l980s. Using
data from 1979-1980, Keith and Herring found that very light-skinned
blacks were on the average more educated than dark-skinned blacks and
were more likely to be employed as professional and technical workers, while
dark-skinned blacks were more likely to be employed as laborers. 57
Although education is a more important variable in predicting socioeconomic
status, Keith and Herring concluded that "skin tone proves to be more
53.
Verna M. Keith & Cedric Herring, Skin Tone and Stratification in the Black Community,
97 AM.]. Soc. 760, 761 (1991) (citing Gunnar Myrdal's study). Myrdal wrote:
Mixed bloods have always been preferred by the whites in practically all respects. They
made a better appearance to the whites and were assumed to be mentally more capable.
They had a higher sales value on the slave market .... Many white fathers freed their
illegitimate mulatto offspring ... , or gave them the opportunity to work out their
freedom on easy terms. Some were helped to education and sent to the free states in the
North. Some were given a start in business or helped to acquire land .... [While)
[e)mancipation broadened the basis for a Negro upper class .... [b)lackness of skin remained
undesirable and even took on an association of badness.
1 MYRDAL, supra note 21, at 696--97. In their 1945 study of blacks in New York City, social
scientists St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Clayton wrote that many blacks, male and female, "feel
that white people, by favoring lighter Negroes, make it hard for dark-skinned Negroes to secure
personal-service jobs as well as other types of employment." DRAKE & CLAYTON, supra note 51,
at 499.
54.
1 MYRDAL, supra note 21, at 697. He conceded, however, that in 1944, the lightskinned privilege was not as available in the South because of the less favorable socioeconomic
condition of blacks there. Myrdal continued that "[p)erhaps of even greater importance is the fact
that the Negro Community itself has accepted this color preference." Id. Even the esteemed
black intellectual W.E.B. DuBois was not above colorphobia. In 1923 DuBois, a very light-skinned
black, wrote an article in the Century Magazine critical of dark-skinned Jamacian-born Marcus
Garvey's "Back to Africa" movement. DuBois described Garvey as a "little, fat, black man, ugly,
but with intelligent eyes and a big head." Garvey then attacked DuBois in the pages of the Negro
World accusing DuBois, among other things, of calling his own race "black and ugly." Marcus
Garvey, W.E.B. DuBois as a Hater of Dark People, in VOICES OF A BLACK NATION: POLITICAL
jOURNALISM IN THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE 99-100 (Theodore G. Vincent ed., 1990).
55.
1 MYRDAL, supra note 21, at 698.
56.
See Keith & Herring, supra note 53, at 767-fJ8.
57.
See id. at 760-78.
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consequential than ... parental socioeconomic status and all of the sociodemo58
graphic variables." Thus, their conclusions virtually parallel those of studies
59
completed before the civil rights movement.
58.
/d. at 772. "Skin color may ... constituteD a special trauma for black women, since a
woman's worth traditionally rests on her physical appearance much more than a man's for whom
money and position count more than looks, at least on the marriage market." Brita LindbergSeyersted, The Color Black: Skin Color as Social, Ethic~!, and Esthetic Sign in Writings by Black
American Women, 73 ENG. STUD. 51,64 (1992). In 1904, the black essayist Nannie Helen Burroughs
wrote a series of articles criticizing color consciousness among black men "who would rather marry
a woman for her color than her character." She also criticized black women who used skin lighteners
and hair straighteners. PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK
WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 115 ( 1984).
In their study, Keith and Herring found that skin tone is a more significant stratifying factor
for women than men when "determining education, occupation, and family," but not personal
income. Keith & Herring, supra note 53, at 773. Both pairs of researchers (Keith and Herring,
Drake and Clayton) attribute the differential effects of black women's family as opposed to
personal income to a preference by successful black men for light-skinned wives. Thus, there may
be a stronger correlation between socially constructed notions of attractiveness based on skin tone
for black women than for black men. Once more, contemporary findings seem to mirror earlier
ones. In their 1945 study, Drake and Clayton concluded that skin tone has more significant
economic consequences for black women than black men.
[W)hen Negroes show preferences or draw invidious distinctions on the basis of skincolor, Bronzeville call them "partial to color." And "partial to color" always means "partial
to less color"-to light color. The outstanding example of partiality to color is seen in
men's choices of female associates .... When the charge is made that successful Negro
men put a premium on women that "look like white," it would be more accurate to say
that they seem to put a premium on marrying a woman who is not black or very darkbrown.
DRAKE & CLAYTON, supra note 51, at 497-98.
Literature by and about black women reflects a similar thread. Literary critic Mary Helen
Washington writes,
[i)f the stories of these writers are to be believed, then the color/hair problem has cut
deep into the psyche of the black woman. It is that particular aspect of oppression that
has affected, for the most part, only women .... the color theme almost always plays at least a
peripheral role-more often a significant one-in the lives of the women characters
created by women writers .... the idea of beauty as defined by white America has been
an assault on the personhood of the black woman.
MARY HELEN WASHINGTON, BLACK-EYED SUSANS: CLASSIC STORIES BY AND ABOUT BLACK
WOMEN xvii (1975). Author and poet Alice Walker writes that skin tone discrimination within
the black community is an especially divisive influence on black women. See ALICE WALKER, IN
SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS: WOMANIST PROSE 290-91, 311 (1983).
59.
See Keith & Herring, supra note 53, at 777. More recently, two social scientists using
data from a 1980 sample of black adults found that blacks "with lighter skin have greater education,
occupational prestige, personal income, and family income than those with darker skin and that
these relationships are not explained by the fact that lighter-skinned blacks come from higher
socioeconomic status backgrounds." Michael Hughes & Bradley R. Hertel, The Significance of
Color Remains: A Study of Life Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic Consciousness Among Black
Americans, 69 Soc. FORCES 1105, 1109 (1990). Reviewing earlier studies, Hughes and Hertel
concluded that there had been "no substantial change in the relationship between skin color and
socioeconomic status from 1950 to 1980." /d. at 1114. These researchers did conclude, however,
"that [today) skin color appears to affect education less for young people than older people." /d. at
1115.
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A more recent study of 2000 men in Los Angeles found that race, skin
tone, and the existence of a criminal record are major factors in determining
whether men with similar educational backgrounds are employed. According to the study, being black and dark-skinned reduced a man's odds of work60
ing by 52 percent. The researchers were testing the validity of the "cultural
capital hypothesis" that underlies the conservative Republicans' Contract
61
with America.
This hypothesis suggests that "a decline in individual
responsibility and in family values, rooted primarily in the liberal socialwelfare programs of the 1960s, is principally responsible for rising rates of
persistent poverty, joblessness, family disruption, out-of-wedlock births, and
62
gang- and drug-related violence."
After controlling for criminal record, the researchers found that
"[l]ight-skinned African-American men were more likely than their darkskinned counterparts to be working, although their rate of unemployment
63
(20 percent) was still relatively high compared with that of white males."
The light skin tone advantage, the researchers concluded, seemed greatest
for black males with thirteen or more years of education. Only 10.3 percent
of light-skinned black men with some college education were unemployed
compared with 19.4 percent of similarly educated dark-skinned black men.
More importantly, the unemployment rates of white males and light-skinned
64
black males were almost identical. This study suggests that light skin tone
appears to mitigate, but not completely eliminate, the employment consequences of racial bias for light-skinned blacks with some college education.
In determining skin tones, the researchers instructed interviewers to rate
the men surveyed according to color using three skin color categories: light,
medium, and dark. The researchers concluded that the impact of skin tone
was fuzzier for medium-skinned black men, but lumped them with lightskinned black men because their responses more closely resembled those of

60.
See James H. Johnson, Jr. & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., Race Still Matters, CHRON. HIGHER
Eouc., July 7, 1995, at A48.
61.
The Contract with America was a 10-point program "engineered by House Speaker-to-be
Newt Gingrich of Georgia and signed by more than 300 GOP candidates before the Nov. 8 [1994)
election .... It promised that within the first 100 days of GOP control, the House would vote on
welfare reform, tough crime-fighting laws, higher defense spending, tax cuts and votes on constitutional amendments requiring a balanced budget and term limits." David Bauman, Central Lawmakers
Set Goal: Enact Contract with America, GANNETI NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 21, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File, Wires Folder.
62.
Johnson & Farrell, supra note 60.
63.
Id. Additionally, "dark-skinned African-American males with a criminal record had a
jobless rate of 54 per cent, compared with 41.7 per cent for light-skinned African-American males
and 25 per cent for white males." Id.
64.
See id. "[T)he unemployment rate for light-skinned black males was only a little higher
than the 9.5-per-cent rate for white males with comparable schooling." Id.
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65

light- as opposed to dark-skinned respondents. This finding suggests that
skin tone has the most severe employment consequences for dark as opposed
66
to light- or medium-skinned black men. In-group antipathy alone cannot
explain this disparity in economic outcomes, because a disproportionate
number of employers are not black.
Given the studies' suggestion that light skin tone is linked with economic
privilege, the discrimination claim in the Walker case seems ironic and
counterintuitive. Tracy Walker claimed that her light skin tone caused the
loss of her job at the IRS because of the racialized antagonism of her darkskinned black supervisor. Walker's claim, however, is not really aberrant.
The dualism in blacks' perception of the relevance of skin tone categories
in a highly racialized society may explain this seeming irony. Myrdal, for
example, found that the existence of a light-skinned preference within the
black community "does not prevent the expression of strong antagonisms
67
to[ward] light-skinned persons by the rest of the group."
65.
See Telephone Interview with James H. Johnson, Jr., Professor of Geography, Business,
and Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (July 24, 1995).
66.
There may also be health consequences associated with dark skin. At least three studies
found a significant correlation between skin tone and blood pressure levels. See, e.g., Robert F.
Murray, Jr., Skin Color and Blood Pressure: Genetics or Environment?, 265 JAMA 639 (1991). Two
studies found that education and social class were the key factors in higher blood pressure levels,
not skin tone. The most recent study, however, found a strong correlation between darker skin
color among persons of lower socioeconomic status and higher blood pressure levels. See Michael
J. Klag eta!., The Association of Skin Color With Blood Pressure in US Blacks With Low Socioeconomic
Status, 265 JAMA 599 (1991).
67.
2 MYRDAL, supra note 21, at 1383. After Harlem Renaissance writer Alice DunbarNelson, described as "fair enough to 'pass' for white," was
tormented and ostracized by the darker children in school as a "[l)ight nigger, with straight
hair," she moved north to college, where she came "up against a dead wall of hate and
prejudice and misunderstanding" for the same reason .... At her first teaching job she and
other "half white" teachers [were) dogged by "spite" and "unreasonable
prejudice" .... Thus, her whole life [was) spent between the Scylla and Charybdis of
intra- and interracial hell.
GLORIA T. HULL, COLOR, SEX & POETRY: THREE WOMEN WRITERS OF THE HARLEM
RENAISSANCE 34, 101-02 (1987). Gloria Wade-Gayles, in her contemporary memoir, writes that
her childhood peers tormented her about the women in her family:
"High yellow women. Uppity. Think their color make them better than anybody else."
I remember that tensions around color were often serious in the housing project. "I can't
begin to tell you," my aunt said to me recently, "what a hard time Bertha and I had
because of our color." She remembers the ugly name-calling and the accusation that
they were children of a white man who disowned them and, worse, that, like all highyellow women, they would seek out white men as lovers. "Yellow shit," fair-skinned black
women were called. "Dark-skinned women had a hard time .... But we had a hard time
too."

GLORIA WADE-GAYLES, PUSHED BACK TO STRENGTH: A BLACK WOMAN'S JOURNEY HOME 16

(1993).
Even the light-skinned W.E.B. DuBois, while denouncing intraracial colorism, remarked that
he stopped dating "one 'colored' girl because she looked quite white, and I should resent the
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Skin tone differences, however, seem to have only minimal effects on
68
the attitudes of blacks toward black political candidates. In contrast, skin
tone, in addition to race, may be a factor considered by white voters when
69
evaluating black political candidates. One social scientist speculates that
dark-skinned black political candidates running for office or seeking more
prestigious offices in predominately white districts may be evaluated more
70
negatively than light-skinned black candidates.
In a recent study, each participant was given a two-page informational
packet about one of three fictitious gubernatorial candidates from a neighboring state. A photograph of either a white male, a light-skinned black male,
or a dark-skinned black male was attached to the packet. The participant
was asked to rate the candidate, and to indicate whether she or he would
vote for him. The researcher found the white participants rated the white
candidates higher than the either the dark-skinned or the light-skinned
71
black candidate with identical qualifications. In addition, the dark-skinned
candidate was more harshly evaluated than his light-skinned counterpart,
72
especially by people rated as racially intolerant. As a result, the researcher
concluded that dark-skinned black political candidates face "a triple bias73
race, prejudice, and skin color." This study and the historical evidence of
whites' attitudes toward mulattos suggest that some whites may be strongly
influenced by skin tone as well as by a person's racial identity.
Students participating in a survey conducted by Midge Wilson, a
professor at DePaul University, reacted similarly. When viewing two
pictures of the same black woman, one with light skin and the other with
dark skin, the students attributed positive qualities to the light-skinned black
woman and very negative qualities to the darkened version of the same
picture. 74 Thus, colorism within the black community reflects the dominant
inference on the street that I had married outside my race." Scales-Trent, supra note 36, at 81.
Professor Scales-Trent cites other notable examples, including former Washington, D.C., mayor,
Marion Barry, who urged his light-skinned second wife Effi Barry to use a sunlamp to darken her
skin because "folks were talking all about how his wife was 'too light."' /d. at 79.
68.
See Richard Seltzer & Robert C. Smith, Color Differences in the Afro-American

Community and the Differences They Make, 21
69.
See T erkildsen, supra note 51.
See id. at 1033.
70.
71.
See id. at 1048.
72.
See id.
73.
/d.
74.
See Nightline, supra note 13.

J. BLACK STUD. 279, 282-85 (1991).

"Midge Wilson: We found that there was a positive halo effect around the light-skinned
woman on various adjectives like to what extent do you see this woman as popular, socially
skilled, likely to be happy in her love life, successful, intelligent." One student remarked that
the dark-skinned woman looked like a prostitute. Still another student that the normal size
black woman looked larger than the light-skinned version. Other students, looking at pictures
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culture's attitude toward blacks who look least-and most-European. Discrimination based on skin tone, whether practiced by blacks, whites, or other nonwhites, constitutes a form of race-based discrimination. Yet, when faced with
colorism claims, courts often respond in confusing and contradictory ways.

II.

COLORISM AND THE COURTS

Litigants usually rely on two statutes to advance colorism discrimi75
nation claims: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. section
1981.76 Section 1981 guarantees all persons the same rights as white citizens,77
and makes no reference to either the words "race" or "color." Title VII contains
both terms, but defines neither.

A.

Section 1981 Cases

1.

Early Colorism Cases

78
Latinas/os do not fit neatly within America's traditional rigid racial categories.79 Writing in The New Yorker, Lawrence Wright found it inconceivable
of two black Americans, each with a dark and lighter version "considered the darker people
less cordial, less appealing and less attractive than the lighter skinned version of the same person."

I d.
75.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (1964). Title VII provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer( 1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
76.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Section 198l(a) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

Id.

77.
Id. Section 1981 and its companion, section 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994), "were intended
to 'break down all discrimination between black men and white men."' Franceschi v. Hyatt Oxp., 782 F.
Supp. 712, 715-16 (O.P.R. 1992) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866) (remarks of the
chief congressional supporter of both sections, Senator Trumbull, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee)).
78.
I use the term Latina/a throughout this paper when referring to people who come from
or who have ancestors from "the territory in the Americas colonized by Latin nations, such as Portugal,
Spain, and France, whose languages are derived from Latin." Oquendo, supra note 26, at 97. The
term '"Hispanic' has been rejected by some because of its association with 'the Spanish colonial
power of centuries ago."' Id. at 96.
79.
In the 1970s, the Office of Management and Budget promulgated Directive 15, Race and
Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting, prescribing racial and ethnic cate-
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that Latinas/os could be a race because of the great variation of "races"black, white, and Native American-and the large percentage of mestizas/os
80
within this group of people.
Because section 1981 does not cover
discrimination based on national origin, courts often struggle to fit discrimination claims by Latina/o plaintiffs into the section 1981 framework.
In some early section 1981 colorism cases involving Latina/o plaintiffs,
courts used ethnicity as a synonym for race if the plaintiff's racial identity was
unclear. These courts linked skin tone with ethnicity in recognizing a race
claim. For example, in 1977, when the Mexican American plaintiff in Vigil
v. City of Denver81 sued his public employer under section 1981 alleging
82
discrimination based on race, color, and national origin, the court allowed
the color claim, reasoning that Mexican Americans often are identified on
the basis of their skin tone, and thus a claim of discrimination based on color
83
may be a basis for discrimination against Mexican Americans. Even though
Mexican Americans were classified by the government in the 1970s as white
for census purposes, 84 the court said:
Although skin color may vary significantly among individuals who are
considered Mexican-Americans, skin color may be a basis for discrimination against them. We note that skin color may vary significantly
among individuals who are considered "blacks" or "whites"; both
these groups are protected by § 1981, and § 1981 is properly asserted
where discrimination on the basis of color is alleged. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has concluded that in the Denver area, MexicanAmericans are victims of the same type of discriminatory treatment as
blacks: ["]Negroes and Hispanoes in Denver suffer identical discrimination in treatment when compared with the treatment afforded Anglo
85
students. ["]
gories to be used in reporting federal statistics. See LOTI, supra note 2, at 35. Of the five categories,
the "Hispanic" category is the only one classified as an ethnic rather than racial category. The ethnic
designation "Hispanic" acknowledged that discrimination might occur because of national origin
without regard to a person's race. Thus, persons identified as Hispanic also could designate race-white
or black. See id. at 42.
80.
See Wright, supra note 4, at 52.
81.
No. 77-F-197, 1977 WL 41 (D. Colo. May 23, 1977).
82.
See id.
83.
See id. at *1-*2.
84.
In the 1930 census, Mexicans were classified as a separate race, but by the 1940 census
the category was removed after protests from Mexico over the implication that a separate racial category for persons of Mexican ancestry meant that they were not white. See Sharon M. Lee, Racial
Classifications in the US Census: 1890-1990, 16 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 75, 79 (1993). In the
1980 census, "individuals who wrote in their race as 'Brown' or 'Mexicano' were not reassigned to
another category (for example, White) but were counted as 'Other."' 1d at 80. For further discussion
of this point, see infra note 131.
85.
Vigil, 1977 WL 41, at *1-*2 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973)
(citation omitted)).
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The court linked ethnicity and discrimination based on dark skin tone with
discrimination against blacks, suggesting that dark skin tone is a negative
racial marker.
Courts' willingness to draw connections between race and the ethnicity
and skin tone ofLatinas/os is a thread running through the section 1981 cases
86
involving Latina/a litigants. In Cubas v. Rapid American Corp., the plaintiff, a Cuban-born naturalized citizen, alleged discrimination based on race
and alienage, claiming that "Cuban-Americans may be considered a non7
white racial group within the meaning of§ 1981.',s Conceding that case law
88
provides little guidance, the district court declined to determine the plaintiffs race, but concluded that as a matter of law it cannot discount the possi89
bility that the plaintiff suffered "elements of racial discrimination."
Courts seem less willing to make this connection when the race of the
90
Latina/a litigant is clearly identified. In O'Loughlin v. Procon, Inc., a section
1981 race claim, the plaintiff, described as "a black male citizen of Cuba,'m
lost in part because the court concluded that the absence of claims by other
92
blacks about racial slurs was proof that the plaintiffs claims were groundless.
The court failed to consider that because the plaintiff, Hugh O'Loughlin,
was black and Cuban, he might have been differentially racialized from black
93
Americans due to his ethnicity.

86.
420 F. Supp. 663 (E.O. Pa. 1976).
87.
Id. at 665 (emph~sis added).
88.
See id. at 666 n.2.
89.
Id. at 666. ("We cannot find, as a matter of law, that the alleged discrimination against
the plaintiff as a Cuban American did not contain elements of racial discrimination.").
90.
627 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
91.
Id. at 676.
92.
See id. at 678.
93.
Ethnicity often is confused with national origin. National origin usually refers to the
country of recent origin, whereas ethnicity is often used to denote ancestry, the cultural identity or
origin of one's ancestors. In fact, from a legal perspective there may be little real difference between
race and ethnicity in the United States; the terms may simply represent "categories of social
hierarchy[,] ... just labels for different magnitudes of distance from the most desirable status on a
continuum of okayness. The farther out a population is on that continuum, the more likely it will
be seen as a racial group." Adolph Reed, Jr., Skin Deep: The Fiction of Race, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept.
24, 1996, at 22. Juan Perea argues that the term national origin "does not, and cannot, correctly
encompass the protection of ethnic traits or ethnicity [and] is not helpful in describing accurately
or recognizing the kind of discrimination that should be prohibited under Title VII." Juan F.
Perea, Ethnicity and Prejuaice: Reevaluating 'National Origin' Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 805, 810 (1994) (citing jOE R. FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 8-9
(3d ed. 1989)). Juanita Tamayo Lott writes that what constitutes ethnicity varies from country to
country. "In Canada, the focus is on ancestry .... In Malaysia, as well as in India and Indonesia,
religion, language, and caste are definitive features. In the United States, attention is to skin color
and blood quantum." LOTI, supra note 2, at 25.
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Thus, if a plaintiffs race is unclear, as in Vigil and Cubas, the courts use
ethnicity and skin tone as surrogates for race. As one court said in allowing a
claim by a Mexican American, under section 1981, race encompasses "some
94
non-racial ... ethnic groups." When, however, the plaintiffs race is clearly
identified, as in O'Loughlin, courts tend to ignore the impact of skin tone and
ethnicity. This tendency has a disproportionate impact on litigants with apparent African ancestry.
Courts' refusal to consider the impact of ethnicity in race claims involving black litigants is even more apparent in disputes between two black
95
litigants. In Sere v. Board of Trustees, the plaintiff, a black Nigerian, sued
his light-skinned black American supervisor, alleging discrimination based
on race and national origin. The federal district court dismissed Sere's discrimination claim, treating his case as a national origin claim and thus not
96
cognizable under section 1981. The court labeled both Sere and his lightskinned black American supervisor as black, and it noted that Sere's replace97
ment was a light-skinned black American. In dismissing Sere's colorism
claim, the trial judge acknowledged that discrimination based on skin tone
can occur among members of the same racialized group, but concluded that
the plaintiff failed to establish that a colorism claim was actionable under
98
section 1981. The court opined that recognition of colorism claims would
force courts to engage "in the unsavory business of measuring skin color and
determining whether the skin pigmentation of the parties is sufficiently differ99
ent to form the basis of a lawsuit. " Yet, in other cases involving Latinas/os,
courts seem more willing to engage in just this sort of inquiry.
In both O'Loughlin and Sere, the courts view race discrimination very
narrowly. This narrow construction of race for parties with any African ancestry ignores ethnic or color differences between the parties that result in different racial statuses. In O'Loughlin, the court measured the claim of a black
Cuban in relation to an employer's treatment of black Americans. The court
in Sere treated the claim of a black Nigerian like a suit between two black
Americans, rather than a claim between a black Nigerian and a light-skinned
black American. Arguably, Sere was claiming that his black American supervisor discriminated against him because, as a Nigerian, he might have physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics different from those of most black

94.

Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 970 (lOth Cir. 1979) (citing McDonald

v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1988).
See id. at 1546. The court did allow the Title VII national origin claim.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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Americans. 100 The definition of the racial category "black" is firmly grounded
101
in the rule of hypo-descent. Any remote African ancestry makes one indistinguishably black and blinds courts to the racial meanings conveyed by ethnicity and skin color. The preference by some white and black employers for
light-skinned black employees is grounded in the stigma attached to African
slavery. Thus, skin tone bias, rather than traditional racial animus, can be
an alternative basis of discrimination against a dark-skinned person of African
descent.

2.

Saint Francis College v. Al-Khaz:raji

As the preceding discussion suggests, courts in the early section 1981
colorism cases failed consistently to recognize ethnic or color differences when
analyzing race-based discrimination claims. Any uncertainty in this area should
have been resolved when the U.S. Supreme Court in Saint Francis College
v. Al-Khaz:raji 102 recognized that a section 1981 race claim can lie between
100.
Justice William J. Brennan, concurring in Saint Francis College, wrote:
It is true that one's ancestry-the ethnic group from which an individual and his or her
ancestors are descended-is not necessarily the same as one's national origin-the country
"where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors
came." Often, however, the two are identical as a factual matter: one is born in the nation
whose primary stock is one's own ethnic group. Moreover, national origin claims have
been treated as ancestry or ethnicity claims in some circumstances.
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 614 (1987) (quoting Espinoza v. Farah,
414 u.s. 86, 88 (1973)).
101.
The sociologist F. James Davis wrote:
The definition [of who is black) reflects the long experience with slavery and later
with Jim Crow segregation. In the South it became known as the "one drop rule," meaning
that a single drop of "black blood" makes a person a black. It is also known as the "one
black ancestor rule," some courts have called it the "traceable amount rule," and
anthropologists call it the "hypo-descent rule," meaning that racially mixed persons are
assigned the status of the subordinate group. This definition emerged from the American
South to become the nation's definition, generally accepted by whites and blacks alike.
Blacks had no other choice .... [T)his American cultural definition of blacks is taken for
granted as readily by judges [and) affirmative action officers.
DAVIS, supra note 21, at 5 (citations omitted) (citing HOWARD M. BAHR ET AL., AMERICAN
ETHNIC!TY 27-28 (1979); MELVIN HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 56 (1964)).
For other discussions of the rule of hypodescent, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 'Our Constitution
Is Color-Blind,' 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23-26 (1991). "[W]ith rare exceptions, ethnicity theory isn't
very interested in ethnicity among blacks. The ethnicity approach views blacks as one ethnic group
among others. It does not consider national origin, religion, language, or cultural differences among
blacks, as it does among whites, as sources of ethnicity." OM! & WINANT, supra note 9, at 23. Omi
and Winant conclude that "Blacks are thus aggregated-and treated as the great exceptionbecause they are so clearly racially identified in the US." Id. For a discussion of changing legal
definitions of who is black in Virginia, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff,
Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967,
1967 n.2, 1968, 1972-73, 1975-82 (1989).
102.
481 u.s. 604 (1987).
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parties of different ethnicities who are members of the same race. The plaintiff, Majid Ghaidan Al-Khazraji, a man oflraqi descent, claimed that he was
denied tenure in violation of section 1981 because he was of the Arabian
103
104
race. Iraqis are classified as white under United States law. Saint Francis
College argued unsuccessfully that Al-Khazraji, a white person, could not sue
05
another white person alleging racial discrimination under section 198C
Pointing out that racial categories in this country have changed since
the nineteenth century when section 1981 was enacted, the Court cited examples of European ethnic groups that were considered separate races in the
106
1860s and 1870s. It acknowledged that "[c]lear-cut [racial] categories do not
exist .... [and] some, but not all, scientists ... conclude that racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather than biological,
107
in nature." Thus, the Court concluded that Congress intended section 1981
to protect "identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional
discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics,"
whether or not the discrimination would be classified as racial in terms of
108
modern scientific theory.
103.
See id. at 606.
See id. at 610.
104.
See id. at 609, 613.
105.
See id. at 610 n.4, 611-13.
106.
Id. at 610 n.4.
107.
108.
Id. at 613. The Court's language, disclaimers notwithstanding, sounds like a combination
of historic and scientific characterizations of race. The Court stated that identifiable classes of
persons are "genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive subgrouping of homo
sapiens." Id. The Court's reasoning seems circular. Justice Byron White's language is equivocal,
not clearly rejecting scientific notions of race while acknowledging that race, for Europeans at
least, has a social basis. As recently as 1987, the Court was unwilling to totally abandon "the security
of immutable racial categories." Gotanda, supra note 101, at 29-30. Gotanda notes that:
The Court's modern discussions of race purport to be disengaged from the older
scientific tradition.
However, the Court [in Saint Francis College] was not ready to back away entirely
from the idea that racial categories were based in natural science. Justice White continued,
"[t)he Court of Appeals was thus quite right in holding that§ 1981, 'at a minimum,' reaches
discrimination against an individual 'because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically
and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens."' Justice White's references
to genetics and a "sub-grouping of homo sapiens" have a clear scientific tilt. But in the
next sentence, Justice White again turned away from the physical and back towards the
social. "It is clear from our holding ... that a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to
qualify for§ 1981 protection."
Id. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, admitting that the Court often confuses ancestry or ethnicity and national origin, did not adequately explain this inconsistent language. See Saint Francis
College, 481 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that
[p]ernicious distinctions among individuals based solely on their ancestry are
antithetical to the doctrine of equality upon which this Nation is founded.
Today the Court upholds Congress' desire ro rid the Nation of such arbitrary
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The equivocal language in Saint Francis College about the legal meaning
of race for section 1981 purposes led to confusion in the lower courts about
the meanings of race and ethnicity, especially when skin tone was added to
the mix.
3.

Later Colorism Cases

The Court in Saint Francis College arguably permitted interethnic discrimination claims to be brought in American courts. The post-Saint Francis
College cases have tended to recognize interethnic claims between members
of the same racial group-unless the parties are black. The First Circuit, for
109
example, suggested in Sinai v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. that
an Israeli of Jewish/Hebrew ancestry could establish a race-based discrimination claim against a white person (presumably not of Jewish/Hebrew
ancestry) under section 1981 by stating that "the jury could find that Israel is
one of those countries in which the populace is composed primarily of a particular race." 110 The Third Circuit has also treated discrimination claims
111
between ethnic whites as interracial claims.
Yet, a black litigant who brought a post-Saint Francis College interethnic
claim fared no better than the pre-Saint Francis College litigant in Sere. In
Ohemeng v. Delaware State College, 112 a black Ghanaian college professor
asserted a race-based discrimination claim under both section 1981 and Title
VII. The employer, Delaware State College, an historically black college, discharged Ohemeng rather than considering him for two positions for which
he qualified. Instead, the college hired two Americans, a black and a white ..
Relying, no doubt, on the rationale in Saint Francis College, Ohemeng initially
and invidious discrimination .... I write separately only to point out that the
line between discrimination based on ... "place or nation of ... origin" ... is
not a bright one.
Id. In Justice Brennan's view, ancestry points to the ethnic group from which an individual or her
ancestors are descended, while national origin identifies the country of an individual's origin (where
she was born or from which her ancestors came). Justice Brennan agrees that discrimination based
on birthplace alone is an insufficient basis for a section 1981 claim. See id.
109.
3 FJd 471 (1st Cir. 1993).
110.
Id. at 474. This reasoning seems not only parochial and inaccurate but also unnecessary and confusing in light of Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). Shaare
Tefila Congregation, decided the same day as Saint Francis College, applied the reasoning of that
case, holding that a person of Jewish ancestry could state a claim against a white person under section
1982, which guarantees all citizens the "same right" to lease real property "as is enjoyed by white
citizens." Id. at 616.
111.
See, e.g., Khair v. Campbell Soup Co., 893 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1995) (Egyptian);
Chandoke v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 16 (D.N.J. 1994) (Indian); Gorwara v. AEL
Indus., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (Indian).
112.
676 F. Supp. 65 (D. Del. 1988).
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argued that "he belonged to a subset of the Negroid race having a distinct
113
ancestry or distinct ethnic characteristics" from black Americans. Professor
Ohemeng stated a claim similar to that of the plaintiff in Saint Francis College,
but the district court in a footnote responded that the "plaintiff [had] not fac114
tually developed that claim." One wonders what more Professor Ohemeng
needed to prove. In a footnote, the court said that Ohemeng had failed to
establish a race discrimination claim under either section 1981 or Title VII
115
because he was replaced by a black American.
The meaning of the court's footnote is unclear and troubling in light of
other language in the case. In another footnote appearing in the discussion
of the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claim,
the court questioned whether Ohemeng had established a race claim because
he and his black American "replacement" both are "black," and a plaintiff
116
must establish "that he belongs to a racial minority." Either the court was
applying two different notions of race-a monolithic all-encompassing definition of race under Title VII and a less rigid Saint Francis College definition
under section 1981--or the court was asking Professor Ohemeng to establish
that a Ghanaian is racially different from a black American in the sense of not
being considered racially "black."
Sere, O'Loughlin, and Ohemeng seem inconsistent with other interethnic
colorism cases like Vigil and Cubas. One wonders why courts seem more willing to draw distinctions based on skin tone for Latinas/os and white European
ethnics than for black litigants. The outcomes in Sere and Ohemeng seem
to confirm my suspicion that the rule of hypodescent is deeply, and often
silently, embedded in the race jurisprudence of this country. While the understanding of race for many groups has changed since the mid-nineteenth
century when the earlier version of section 1981 was adopted by Congress,
the understanding of who is black remains unchanged.
Rather than address the complexities of racelike discrimination directed
at black people, judicial application of antidiscrimination law causes "people
to frame their identities in terms of the racial categories recognized by law," 117
not by reality. This shortcoming interferes with attempts to remedy past and
continuing race-based discrimination against black people based on their
African ancestry.

113.
/d. at 68 n.2.
114.
/d.
115.
See id. at 68 n.l, 69 n.3.
116.
ld. at 68. The court asserted that Ohemeng could establish a prima facie case based on
national origin under Title VII because he was a "native Ghanaian" who was replaced by a black
"native American." /d.
117.
HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 22, at 125.
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Title VII Colorism Cases

Unlike section 1981, Title VII specifically mentions "color" as a protected category. The legislative record's silence on the meaning of the term
"color" leaves courts free to determine on their own whether color is synonymous with "race" as traditionally understood, or whether color constitutes
an independent category. Because there are no Title VII federal appellate
cases directly on point, the few district courts that addressed this issue looked
118
to section 1981, "[t]he historical predecessor to Title VII" for guidance.
Given the anecdotal and social scientific evidence regarding colorism
discussed earlier, one would assume that the most common colorism case
would involve a dark-skinned claimant suing to address the inequity resulting
from the social capital possessed by light-skinned members of the same
119
racialized group. Yet, two of the earliest Title VII in-group colorism cases,
Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan 120 and Walker, involved light-skinned
claimants. In Ali, a light-skinned Pakistani from the Punjab province accused
his supervisor, a dark-skinned Pakistan citizen from the Sind province, of
discrimination based on skin tone variation among Pakistanis. The federal
district court dismissed the Title VII claim, saying that Ali failed to
121
establish that his treatment was based on skin color. The court suggested,
however, that colorism claims arising from discriminatory practices not
linked to racial subordination in the United States are actionable under federallaw.122
Recently, another district court suggested that color can be a surrogate
for race in Title VII discrimination actions between individuals of the same
race. The judge wrote that "it is the subjection of a person to intentional
discrimination-because of the belief that he or she belongs to a given
123
race-that renders such behavior actionable."
This reasoning works for
118.
See, e.g., Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 199,
203 (N .0. Ind. 1992) (citations omitted). In Hans borough, the black plaintiff failed to establish an
intraracial discrimination claim.
119.
Sanders v. University of the District of Columbia, No. 88-3614 SS, 1991 U.S. Oist. LEXIS
7448 (D.D.C. June 4, 1991), looks more like the intraracial case one would anticipate. In this case, a
dark-skinned black woman sued unsuccessfully, claiming that her light-skinned black supervisors
"gave preferential treatment to other light-skinned black employees, at her expense." I d. at *2-*3.
120.
508 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See id. at 614. The court also rejected Muhammed Ashraf Ali's national origin claim.
121.

See id.
122.
See id. at 613. The court stated that colorism claims may be based on "indigenous discriminatory practices around the world having nothing to do with the American experience." Id. This
raises an interesting point, whether discrimination based on foreign colorism practices, like those at
issue in Ali, is actionable under Title VII. However, this question is beyond the scope of this Article.
123.
Hansborough, 802 F. Supp. at 206 (quoting Franceschi v. Hyatt Corp., 782 F. Supp. 712,
724 (D.P.R. 1992)).
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interethnic suits between whites and between members of nonwhite groups
like Latinas/os and Asians, but as Sere, O'Loughlin, and Ohemeng indicate,
courts in both Title VII and section 1981 cases do not apply this reasoning to
interethnic claims between blacks.
As mentioned previously, by treating Tracy Walker's colorism claim as
a surrogate for a race-based claim, the court in Walker does what the courts
in Sere and Ohemeng refused to do. In Walker, the court treats the colorism
claim as synonymous with a race claim. By acknowledging Tracy Walker's
mixed racial ancestry, the court creates a space for colorism claims between
people who are raced the same. Yet Walker is problematic. In Walker, the
court acknowledged Tracy Walker's mixed racial ancestry, but implicitly
treated her dark-skinned black supervisor as "unmixed." As Walker and the
section 1981 cases involving Latina/a plaintiffs suggest, courts seem more
willing to entertain colorism claims for persons with mixed racial ancestry.
124
A similar conclusion by the trial judge in Felix v. Marquez seems
crucial to recognition of the colorism claim in that case. Carmen Felix, a
Puerto Rican native, sued another Puerto Rican native claiming that she was
discriminated against because of her race. The judge concluded that a
discrimination claim by one Puerto Rican "with a mixed racial ancestry"
against another Puerto Rican, presumably of "unmixed" racial ancestry,
125
represented one of those rare colorism cases.
After a detailed discussion
of Felix's genealogy and phenotypical characteristics, the trial judge noted
that Felix's maternal grandfather was black, and that her father "had the
126
physical characteristics of a person with a partial African ancestry."
His
comments on the appearance of a witness in the case reaffirmed the importance, in his mind, of skin tone as a racial marker. He wrote: "with due
respect for his emphatic testimony that [the witness] considers his race to be
Puerto Rican, his color would cause him to be identified in the continental
127
United States as Black." In Felix, the plaintiff's skin tone and phenotype
128
used in tandem with genealogy operated as racial markers.
124.
No. 78-2314, 1981 WL 275 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1981).
125.
Id. at *11 ("Color is a rare claim, but considering the mixture of races and ancestral national
origins in Puerto Rico, it can be an appropriate claim for a Puerto Rican to present."). In a footnote
immediately preceding this quote, Judge Pratt wrote that
[a)lthough the legislative history of these acts [federal statutes using the term color) is silent
on the meaning of the term "color," and no definitive interpretation has been provided by
the courts, this court is constrained to believe that "color" is a particularly appropriate term
in the context of this case involving a person from Puerto Rico with a mixed racial ancestry.
Id. at *11 n.11.
126.
Id. at *2. In comments on the color and appearance of other employees who testified, the
judge distinguished between those individuals who looked white, of mixed race, or black. See id. at *8 n.6.
127.
Id. at *8 n.6.
See id. at *2.
128.
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The decision in Felix also suggests that race is a separate and distinct cate129
gory from ethnicity.
Sidestepping the fact that both parties were Puerto
Ricans, and the legal meaning attaching to this fact, the judge explained that
a pure colorism claim was rare "because color is usually mixed or subordi130
nated to claims of race discrimination."
The court sees color claims as being subsumed by race, obscuring the
way in which skin tone within a racialized group can mediate racial discrimination. As a result, what on its face appears to be an intragroup colorism
claim becomes an interracial colorism claim. This result is possible because
131
the court treats Puerto Ricans as an ethnic group composed of many races.

III.

A PREVIEW OF FUTURE COLORISM CLAIMS?

None of the cases discussed thus far look like the colorism cases I anticipate in the future. Sere and Ohemeng are intraracial claims among members of
different ethnic groups, while Walker is an intraracial colorism claim between
members of the same ethnic group. Felix, on the other hand, is an interracial
colorism case between members of the same ethnic group. I expect future
colorism claims that challenge employment practices favoring light- over darkskinned members of the same race. In most cases, employers will be nonblack.
These colorism claims will be interracial, between members of two different
racialized groups. A potential defense to colorism claims is that the employer
hires or promotes members of the plaintiff's racial group, so there is no racebased discrimination.

129.
This kind of reference to race in connection with the colorism claim was repeated at
other places in the opinion. Specifically, the judge at the outset referred to the plaintiff's mixed racial
ancestry. See id. at *5.
Id. at *11. The district court noted that unlike section 1981, Title VII specifically men130.
tions color as a protected category. Unfortunately, there was no legislative history to guide the court
in determining whether "color" as used in the statute was synonymous with "race." See id. at *11 n.11.
131.
Classifications ofLatinas/os or Hispanics for U.S. Census purposes has been problematic.
[P]rior to 1980 most Hispanics classified themselves as racially white within the United
States. In 1960 and 1970 over 95 percent of the immigrants from Latin America were
classified as white. In 1980 the Census Bureau broadened its racial classifications to allow
the Hispanic population to indicate their "Spanish" origin category, but the immigrants
from Latin America continued to classify themselves as other than black or white.
Antonio McDaniel, The Dynamic Racial Composition of the United States, 124 DAEDALUS 179, 189
(1995). Tanya Hernandez writes that Afro-Latinas/os "experience racism based upon their Africanlinked phenotype." Tanya K. Hernandez, Over the Rainbow? Puerto Ricans and the 'Multiracial'
Category in the Year 2000 Census, CRITICA ]. P.R. POL'Y & POL., Aug. 1996, at 1, 6. For further
discussion of this point see Thomas G. Mathews, The Question of Color in Puerto Rico, in SLAVERY
AND RACE RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 299-323 (Robert Brent Taplin ed., 1974).
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One 42 U.S.C. section 1982 case, Rodriguez v. Gattuso, looks more like
the interracial colorism claims I anticipate in the future. Roberto Rodriguez,
described by the court as "a United States citizen of black Latino ancestry,"133 spoke by telephone with Biagio Gattuso about renting one of his
apartments. When Rodriguez, who is dark skinned, met with Gattuso, he
was told that the apartment was no longer available. The next day, when
Rodriguez's wife Carol, characterized by the court as "a United States citizen
134
of white Latino ancestry," telephoned to confirm that the apartment was
not available, Gattuso told her that the apartment was vacant, and she agreed
to meet with him. After meeting with Carol Rodriguez, Gattuso wanted to
meet her husband before finalizing the deal. A few days later, when both
Roberto and Carol arrived to finalize the agreement, Gattuso "reacted in an
135
excited and nervous manner, offering several excuses."
Gattuso claimed
that there were two couples ahead of Roberto and Carol Rodriguez, that the
apartment would not be ready for another few weeks, and that he did not
136
know whether Roberto and Carol Rodriguez were capable of paying the rent.
The court permitted the colorism claim under section 1982 and the Fair
. A ct, 137 saymg
. t h at
H ousmg
[m]ost often "race" and "color" discrimination are viewed as synonymous, just as the term "white citizens" is most often contrasted with
"black citizens"-a racial distinction. But the very inclusion of "color"
as a separate term in addition to "race" in Section 3604(b) implies
strongly that someone who is of the same race ("race" used in the
ethnic sense, not the broader sense announced in St. Francis College
v. Al-Khaz:raji as the 19th century understanding of that term) but
who is treated differently because of his dark skin has been discriminated against because of his color-something expressly forbidden by
138
Section 3604(b).

Thus, the federal district court in Rodriguez does a better job of seeing the
differences and connections among race, ethnicity, and skin color. Ironically, Rodriguez was decided by the same district court that denied the colorism claim in Sere six years earlier.

132.
795 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
133.
ld. at 861.
134.
/d.
135.
ld. at 863.
136.
See id.
137.
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibits discrimination in housing based on "race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." Pub. L.No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 83 (1968) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994)).
138.
Rodriguez, 795 F. Supp. at 865 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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In Saint Francis College, the Supreme Court recognized that discrimination based on ancestry or ethnicity violates the Equal Protection Clause
139
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and treated ancestry or ethnicity claims
like race-based claims. Saint Francis College also suggested that discrimination based on color is similarly prohibited. A close reading of the cases,
however, suggests that courts seem willing to treat discrimination claims based
on color, descent, or ethnicity as racelike for all groups except people of African
descent. While courts seem ready to admit the significance of differences
among groups of people legally classified as nonblack, they refuse to acknowledge ethnic or skin tone differences among people raced as black. This
differential treatment may reflect an implicit understanding of how racial classifications are used by society to regulate behavior, in this instance, the employment opportunities of black men (and women). 140
IV.

A.

IMPLICATIONS AND REFLECTIONS

Dark Skin No More: The Continuing Quest for Light Skin

In 1949, Walter White, a prominent white-looking leader of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, wrote an article in
Look Magazine praising the development of "a chemical that can change the
141
color of skin from black to white." White argued that skin color, more than
phenotype, determines race in the United States, and white skin would allow

139.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because
of ancestry or national origin); see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (holding
under the Equal Protection Clause, that discrimination based on race is permissible only in the
most exceptional circumstances); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (holding
that distinctions based on ancestry violate fundamental American notions of equaliry).
140.
See HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 22, at 111-55 (1996). "The very practice of legally
defining Black identity demonstrates the social, rather than natural, basis of race .... In the name
of racially regulating behavior, laws created racial identities." Id. at 119; see also Richard Ford, Urban
Space and the Color Line: The Consequences of Demarcation and Disorientation in the Postmodem
Metropolis, 9 HARV. BLACKLETIER J. 117, 130 (1992) ("Because race is an unstable identity, its
deployment depends on a symbolic connection between the characteristics that code as race but to
which race cannot be reduced (skin color, facial features, etc.) and some stable referent .... [T]he
maintaining technologies of race [are] primarily economic and spatial.").
141.
Walter White, Has Science Conquered the Color Line?, LOOK MAG., Aug. 30, 1949, at
94. The editors of Look Magazine wrote next to a picture of Walter White on the front page of the
article: "Walter White is one of America's most famous Negro leaders. His skin color (he is only
one-sixty-fourth Negro) enables him to live in either world, black or white." Id. Only after making
this qualifying statement did the editors note that White had won the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People's Spingarn Medal in 193 7 for his fight against lynching and antiblack race riots. See id. at 94.
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more persons of African descent to pass as white.
In the article, he predicted that the discovery of the new skin bleach would signal a new era in
which skin color no longer would be a determinant of a person's ability or
. 1acceptance. 143
socta
For some, the quest for light skin tone continues as the twentieth century ends. Advertisements for skin bleach or fade creme still appear in national
144
magazines aimed at black readers. Even more troubling, in 1997, medical
researcher Scott Mcivor received an e-mail message from a physician who
wanted Mcivor's help. The physician had a patient who, understanding that
researchers had identified the genes that affect skin pigmentation, wanted to
. racta
. 1appearance. 145
ch ange h 1s
The persistent perception about the desirability of light skin as a criteria
for full membership in American society throughout the twentieth century
seems destined to continue into the next century. Yet, the works of Judy
Scales-Trent and Gregory Williams on their lives as "white" black people in

142.
See id. at 95. There is a certain irony in White's remarks. In 1931, black satirist, critic,
anti-Communist, and ultraconservative George Schuyler published Black No More, a novel about
a black man, Max Discher, who becomes white through a chemical process, as an attack on the color
caste system in the United States. In the novel, a black doctor, Dr. Junius Crookman, invents a
whitening process because he believes that becoming white is the only solution to the country's
race problem. Of course, Crookman's solution creates havoc. See GEORGE SCHUYLER, BLACK No
MORE(1931).
143.
See White, supra note 141, at 95.
144.
A sample of the August 2000 edition of four national magazines aimed at blacks disclosed
at least one advertisement for skin bleach or skin fade creme in all but one, Essence. Ebony had a
full page advertisement for Vantex Skin Bleaching Creme, Nothing to Hide, EBONY, Aug. 2000, at
17. Black Opal had a full page advertisement in Today's Black Woman for a fade creme to lighten
dark spots and skin discoloration. TODAY'S BLACK WOMAN, Aug. 2000, at 12. Upscale contained
advertisements for three different products, Clear Essence Medicated Fade Creme, Black Opal
Fade Products, and Daggett & Ramsdell's Skin Bleach Cream. UPSCALE, Aug, 2000, at 65, 83, 139.
In 1997, the continuing popularity of skin bleaches or fade cremes seemed evident when
Walgreen's, a national drug store chain, featured promotional specials during Black History Month
for skin bleach and hair relaxers. See Drugstore's Coupons Seen as Offensive, UP!, Feb. 24, 1997, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File, All. The contemporary popularity of skin bleach among
persons with dark skin extends beyond the United States. See Serge F. Kovaleski, In Jamaica,
Shades of an Identity Crisis; Ignoring Health Risk, Blacks Increase Use of Skin Lightener, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 1999, at A15 (noting the increased popularity of skin bleaching in Jamaica); Corinna
Schuler, Africans Look for Beauty in Western Mirror, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 1999, at
1 (noting the renewed popularity of skin bleaching creams in South Africa); Chris Oliver Wilson,
CaU to Ban Creams for Blacks that Lighten Skin, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 17, 1996, at 11 (warning
of the dangers of hydroquinone, a chemical used in many skin lighters used by blacks and Asians in
Britain and throughout Africa). In 1992, when researchers at Old Dominion University in Virginia
interviewed 66 black women, 36 percent said they wished they could lighten their skin. See Steven
Johnson, Beauty Standards Penalize Ethnicity, Say Non-Caucasians, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 24, 1994,
at 10.
145.
See Rick Weiss, Gene Enhancements' Thorny Ethical Traits: Rapid-fire Discoveries Force
Examination of Consequences, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1997, at Al.
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America illustrate that, in the United States, race is more than color. Race
is so powerful in this country, especially for persons of African descent, that
it can even operate in the absence of color. Nevertheless, as nonwhite racial
categories become more fluid in the twenty-first century, light skin tone may
well mediate some of the harsher aspects of being black in America.
The colorism cases demonstrate the extent to which courts recognize,
explicitly or implicitly, the fluidity of race when determining who is white
and who is nonwhite, but not black. The tendency of courts to leave the
meaning of the racial signifier "black" relatively constant suggests that a
critical issue for the twenty-first century will be to determine the place persons
of apparent African descent will occupy within the social order of the
147
United States. Yet, race is more than a signifier of difference or identity .
Susan Stanford, writing in the context of struggles over the relationship
between and among race and gender, states that "different systems of stratification require acknowledging how privilege and oppression are often not
absolute categories, but rather, shift in relation to different axes of power
148
and powerlessness." Her analysis also applies to the ways in which colorism
practices further socially constructed notions of race even among people raced
as black.
The confusion of courts regarding the complexities of racialization will
become even more apparent when the increasing number of people who
classify themselves as bi- and multiracial, or white, nevertheless encounter
149
discrimination because others identify them as black or nonwhite.
Irani146.
See Beverly I. Moran, Exploring the Mysteries: Can We Ever Know Anything About Race
and Tax?, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1629, 1630 (1998); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 17; Scales-Trent, supra
note 36.
147.
Howard Winant writes that race is "a marker of the infinity of variations we humans
hold as a common heritage and hope for the future." WINANT, supra note 9, at 21.
148.
Susan Stanford Frieman, Beyond White and Other: Relationality and Narratives of Race in
Feminist Discourse, 21 SIGNS 1, 7-8 (1995).
149.
A recent Census Bureau study "found that very few people would classify themselves as
multiracial if given the opportunity to do so." Steven A. Holmes, Census Tests New Category To
Identify Racial Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1996, at A25. One result of including a multiracial
category on the census would be to reduce the number of people identifying themselves as black or
Asian. See id. Considering the high rate of out-marriage among Asians, this finding is not surprising.
But in light of the low rate of out-marriage among blacks, one possible conclusion is that blacks
would use the multiracial category to lessen the stigma or social isolation that attaches to being
black. See id. Eldrick "Tiger" Woods, the golf prodigy, is a contemporary example. Woods proudly
acknowledges his multiracial background. In an interview, Woods stated "that his father was 'a
quarter Native American, a quarter Chinese and half African American,' and that his mother was
'half Thai, a quarter Chinese and a quarter white.' ... But this is an empty equation because social
usage and the major market appeal of Tiger Woods classifies him as black.'' Henry Yu, How Tiger
Woods Lost His Stripes, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1996, at B5. A Sports Illustrated writer characterized
Woods as "the yellow-black-red-white man, ... [the) hope in the American experiment, in the
pell-mell jumbling of genes." Gary Smith, The Chosen One, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 23,
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cally, those features most often associated with black people-dark skin color,
a broad nose, woolly hair, large buttocks, and thick lips-and most easily used
as racial markers, will have less evidentiary weight in establishing discrimi150
nation without recognition of colorism claims.
Despite the need to recognize and address discrimination based on skin
tone,· caution about colorism claims is warranted. One lesson the Title VII
and section 1981 cases teach us is that colorism claims between black litigants are difficult to sustain and to distinguish from claims based on personal
151
Further complicating matters is the
antagonism unrelated to skin color.
1996, at 52 (naming Woods "Sportsman of the Year"). His mother refers to him as the "Universal
Child," the person who "can hold everyone together." Id. at 36. Cynthia L. Nakashima writes
that multiracial individuals are forced to chose the racial or ethnic group with which they belong"[i)n many cases the 'choice' is made for the person by society, based on his or her physical appearance." Cynthia L. Nakashima, An Invisible Monster: The Creation and Denial of Mixed-Race People
in America, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 39, at 162, 176. This statement
is problematic because it denies the individual the capacity to chose voluntarily to identify with one
or more racial and/or ethnic groups and presumes that one's race or ethnicity is imposed externally.
150.
In several recent administrative Title VII cases before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the complaining parties described themselves as of mixed race. See
Oates v. Runyon, 1997 EEOPUB LEXIS 785 (EEOC Mar. 13, 1997) (describing plaintiff's race as
"mixed" and her skin tone as "light brown"); Hill v. Runyon, 1996 EEOPUB LEXIS 3187 (EEOC
May 28, 1996) (alleging discrimination based on "race (mixed)"); Waller v. West, 1995 EEOPUB
LEXIS 3764 (EEOC Aug. 8, 1995) (comparing plaintiff with a fellow employee described as "a
mixed race individual who did not consider himself black or African-American"); Lambert v. Brown,
1994 EEOPUB LEXIS 4127 (EEOC July 8, 1994) (alleging race discrimination and plaintiff
describing himself as "mixed-predominately Caucasian and Native American"); Ellis v. Runyon,
1994 EEOPUB LEXIS 2696 (EEOC Mar. 1, 1994) (alleging discrimination based on race
("mixed") and national origin (African American)).
In two of these cases, the EEOC addressed the mixed race claim. In the first case, Ellis v. Oates,
the complaining party challenged a disciplinary action and subsequent discharge from the U.S. Postal
Service growing out of a verbal altercation and hair pulling incident between her and a woman
the EEOC characterized as another "black female employee." Oates, 1997 EEOPUB LEXIS 785, at 1.
The EEOC reversed the final agency determination. Yet, it treated what seemed to be an intraracial
colorism claim by a party who described herself as mixed and light brown skin, as a traditional
race discrimination claim by a black woman. In the second case, Ellis v. Runyon, Ellis alleged that
his failure to be reappointed to a transitional letter carrier position was the result of race
("mixed"), national origin ("African American"), physical disability, discrimination, and reprisal.
Ellis, 1994 EEOPUB LEXIS 2696, at 2. The EEOC affirmed the final agency decision, holding
that Ellis established that he was a member of a protected group "in that he [wa)s black." Id. at 6.
Once more the EEOC treated a mixed race claim of a person with some African ancestry as a
traditional race discrimination case.
151.
See Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 199, 206
(N.D. Ind. 1992). In Hansborough, the federal district court explored the requirements of an
intraracial colorism claim and dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failure to make any preliminary
showing of discrimination. The court stated that in each case the trier of fact must focus on the
defendant's perception of the plaintiff as belonging to a particular group rather than on physiognomic characteristics. The court acknowledged that intraracial colorism claims are difficult to
sustain and distinguished actionable claims from what it characterized as personal antagonism
unrelated to skin color. See id. at 207.
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question of whether color preference and the resulting discrimination may be
something practiced by all cultures as a result of politically and socially moti•
•
d by t h e Al"z case. 153
. l5Z an tssue
vated b tas,
ratse
In addition, any recognition of colorism claims also must address the
difficulty with using the courts to make skin tone distinctions with significant
legal implications. The federal district judge in Felix, for example, had great
difficulty making legally significant color distinctions. 154 The subjective character of color distinctions is illustrated by the way the judge describes Carmen
Felix, as of a medium shade, and the way she describes herself, as dark olive. 155
Arguably these terms carry different implications. The judge's characterization of Felix as of a medium shade suggests that her complexion is medium
brown, and brown skin tone has a distinct racial connotation in the United
152.
There are several studies documenting a light-skinned preference among foreign children
with no known contact with racial concepts prevalent in this country. See, e.g., Deborah L. Best
et al., Color Bias in a Sample of Young German Children, 38 PSYCHOL. REP. 1145, 1146, (1976)
(noting how young children in Germany evidenced a similar pro-light-skinned bias leading the
researchers to speculate that "a color bias [may) originate[) in early learning experiences which
may be related to the diurnal nature of the young human and which has nothing to do with
race"); D.L. Best et al., Extension of Color Bias Research to Young French and Italian Children, 6 J.
CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 390, 405 ( 197 5) (discussing how young children in France and Italy
appear to mirror the adult tendency in the United States, France, and Italy to evaluate white more
positively than black, and light-skinned humans more positively than dark-skinned humans);
Saburo lwawaki et al., Color Bias Among Young Japanese Children, 9 J. CROSS-CULTURAL
PSYCHOL. 61, 70 (1978) (discussing how young Japanese children evidence the same degree of
pro-light-skinned and anti-dark-skinned bias as children in Western countries). There also are other
studies of foreign colorism practices that may or may not be related to some "race" or caste
discrimination. See, e.g., Christopher Bagley & Loretta Young, Evaluation ofColor and Ethnicity in
Young Children in Jamaica, Ghana, England, and Canada, 12 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 45-59
(1988) (discussing light-skinned preference among children in disparate countries); Sarla Banerjee,
Assortative Mating for Colour in Indian Populations, 17 J. BIOSOC. SCI. 205 ( 1985) (discussing lightskinned preference when selecting marriage partners); A. Henik et al., Color, Skin Color
Preferences and Self Color Identification Among Ethiopian- and Israeli-Born Children, 3 ISRAELI Soc.
SCI. RES. 74 (1985) (discussing light-skinned preferences involving light- and dark-skinned Jews in
Israel).
Arguably, some of these preferences may be connected to the precolonial dominance of darkskinned groups by invading light-skinned groups. For example, one nonracial explanation of light
skin preference is that it simply reflects "a general prolight/antidark bias" stemming from early
learning experiences equating light with day and dark with night, that are reinforced by other
social processes such as the use of blackness to symbolize badness or evil, and whiteness to symbolize
goodness. John E. Williams & J. Kenneth Morland, Comment on Banks's "White Preference in
Blacks: A Paradigm in Search of a Phenomenon," 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 28, 31 (1979) (discussing
research in this area and questioning whether racial bias is a cause of light skin preference among
black people); see e.g., HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 22, at 173-74 (citing FRANTZ FANON, BLACK
SKIN WHITES MASKS 188-89 (Charles Lam Markmann trans., 1967) (discussing European associations of blackness with evil and whiteness with goodness)).
153.
See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
154.
Felix v. Marquez, No. 78-2314, 1981 WL 275, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1981).
155.
"Felix's own skin color, which she described as dark olive, appeared to the court to be a
medium shade." I d. at *8 n.6.
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States: It means nonwhite. However, the term "olive," used by Felix is often
used to describe Southern Europeans like Italians or other European ethnic
groups considered white in the United States. Descriptions of skin tone in
156
this country invariably convey race.
Thus, solutions are understandably
elusive.
B.

Simple Solutions to Colorism Claims?

As my prior discussion of colorism cases suggests, some judicial precedents support recognizing intragroup colorism claims. The problems presented
by cases like Sere, Ohemeng, O'Loughlin, and Walker could easily be
addressed without dramatically changing current civil rights jurisprudence.
Yet, some scholars oppose recognition of intragroup colorism claims. They
157
argue that intragroup claims undercut race-based claims and divert attention
158
from "the larger issue of societal racism." This rationale for the nonrecognition of colorism claims trivializes the economic implications of these claims
for substantial numbers of black people who lack the social capital conferred
at birth upon their light-skinned racial counterparts.
Opposition to intragroup colorism claims within the black community
might also be fueled by the fear that, as in the Walker case, light-skinned
black plaintiffs will prevail over dark-skinned black defendants-thereby
enhancing, rather than equalizing, the social capital created by light skin
tone. If a light-skinned black preference translates into tangible socioeconomic benefits or social capital, these opponents argue, then allowing
light-skinned blacks to recover for skin tone discrimination would be somewhat analogous to whites prevailing in reverse discrimination cases.
Arguably, these two circumstances are distinguishable. Reverse discrimination claims usually involve attacks on nonwhite racial preferences
designed to remedy past and continuing discrimination or racial imbalance
in favor of whites. These claims can and should be distinguished from racebased discrimination claims by whites based on some invidious racial animus
directed toward them because they are white. By analogy, with claims of
this second sort, intragroup claims by light-skinned plaintiffs (like Walker
or Ali), if based on proof of race-related animus such as skin tone, should be
permitted.
156.
"The association of light skin with status and thus attractiveness meant that skin color
became a vehicle for bias among African-Americans, even though light skin was less common
than dark. Value-laden terms evolved that reflected bias, such as high-yellow, ginger, cream-colored,
and bronze." Ronald E. Hall, Bias Among African-Americans Regarding Skin Color: Implications for
Social Work Practice, 2 RES. ON Soc. WORK PRAC. 479, 480 (1992) (citations omitted).
157.
See Recent Case, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (1990).
158.
Collier-Thomas & Turner, supra note 12, at 7.
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Some proponents of intragroup claims, while supportive of attempts to
expand federal civil rights laws to cover different forms of race-based discrimination,159 would focus on the defendant's conduct, rather than the plaintiffs
160
skin tone. They argue that the subjectivity of race and ethnicity often makes
161
racial identification of plaintiffs difficult. Under this conduct-focused theory,
courts would inquire into whether the defendant's acts "invoked a racist
ideology ... [not] whether society commonly perceives the plaintiff to belong
62
. act wou ld be
to a separate race. "' A ccord'mg to t h ese proponents, a raetst
any act communicating "that the plaintiff is a member of a group that shares
163
a genetic makeup distinct from some comparative group."
Therefore, the
defendant's impression of the plaintiff's racial identity, not the plaintiff's perception of her or his own identity, would be the key to recovery.
While helpful, this approach suffers from a fundamental limitation. Its
supporters propose eliminating racial identification as a trigger for intragroup
colorism claims because, as mentioned previously, race and ethnicity are
subjective. Subjective racial perceptions, however, are the most common
signifiers of race and determinants of social and economic status. Denying
the reality attached to perceptions of another's racial identity ignores an
important way in which race is constructed in this country.
One commentator acknowledges that courts currently permit intragroup
colorism claims between members of white ethnic groups, but proposes only
that "blacks [have] the same right as whites to claim intraracial discrimination."164 This approach does not go far enough in remedying the problem
because it only addresses intragroup claims like Sere and Ohemeng. Recognition of intragroup colorism claims alone would not address the larger
problem posed by interracial colorist employment practices.
Other scholars, like Deborah Ramirez, argue that we should abandon
165
racial categories as we move toward a more multicultural society. However,
the deliberate nonrecognition of race in a legal context makes the acknowledgement and identification of racism more difficult because race-conscious
policies like affirmative action rely on these categories to overturn, not to
159.
See Sandi J. Robson, Note, Intra-Racial, Color-Based Discrimination and the Need for
Theoretical Consistency After Walker v. Internal Revenue Service, 35 VILL. L. REV. 983, 1006-07
(1990); see also Linda A. Lacewell & Paul A. Shelowitz, Case Comment, Beyond a Black and White
Reading of Sections 1981 and 1982: Shifting the Focus from Racial Status to Racist Acts, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 823 (1987).
160.
See Robson, supra note 159, at 1001.
161.
See Lacewell & Shelowitz, supra note 159, at 849-50.
162.
Id. at 849-50.
163.
Id.
164.
Amy Weinstein, Case Comment, Must Employers Be Colorblind? Title VII Bars Intra-Racial
Employment Discrimination, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 213, 224 (1990).
165.
See Ramirez, supra note 26, at 974.
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166

enforce, racial oppression. Even Ramirez grants that simply abolishing racial
categories will not change people's beliefs or behaviors, especially when
there are "proven patterns of institutional bias [that] may require racial and
ethnic classifications to remedy past identified discrimination against par. l ar groups. ,167
ttcu
Further, to be without a racial identity in a thoroughly racialized society
168
like the United States is like having no identity.
Thus, Peggy Pascoe
169
argues that eliminating racial categories simply perpetuates racism.
She
sees race in the mid-twentieth century as nothing more than a broader version
170
of ethnicity.
Race-related discrimination continues, and denying the
economic and social meanings the United States still attaches to race by
abolishing racial categories will not make race-based and race-related
discrimination disappear.
Granted, the continued existence of legalized racial categories reinforces
commonly held notions of race and encourages people to think of them171
selves and others in racial terms.
Nevertheless, the law must be able to
respond to subordinating uses of race, especially when they have significant
economic consequences. As the colorism cases suggest, negative consequences arise for the most vulnerable segments of the black community when
courts and governments blindly apply a monolithic definition of the racial
172
category "black" based on the hypodescent rule.
In addition, complicity
166.
See id. at 968-69.
167.
I d. at 985.
168.
See WINANT, supra note 9, at 16. Neil Gotanda writes that a person with no identity
in a racialized society has two options: "(F]ollow an assimilationist approach, seeking adaptation to
majority society .... [or not assimilate and] be constitutionally condemned to a marginal
existence in the future society." Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity,
and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1141 (1996).
169.
See Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of "Race" 83 J. AM.
HIST. 44, 67 (1996).
170.
See id. As a result, cultural arguments are not considered racist today because conservatives define race so narrowly. See id. at 68.
171.
See HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 22, at 125 ("The necessary persistence of racial categories
in law lends legitimacy to the notion that race exists in fact, leading people to think not only of
others but of themselves in racial terms."). As Professor Haney Lopez points out, "[v]indicating
the rights of minorities has required maintaining a legal system that distinguishes between Whites
and non-Whites, even though these classifications arose from efforts to subordinate those
constructed as non-Whites." Id.
172.
Governments still apply and enforce the rule of hypodescent with respect to people
with almost any African ancestry. A clear example is the unsuccessful effort of Susie Guillory
Phipps in the 1980s to get Louisiana to change the racial designation on her birth certificate from
"black" to "white." See DAVIS, supra note 21, at 8-11; Calvin Trillin, American Chronicles: Black
or White, NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 1986, at 62. State law declared that anyone with one thirty-second
"Negro blood" to be black. The Louisiana state trial and appellate courts upheld the constitutionality of the fractional racial classification statute. See Doe v. State, 4 79 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct.
App. 1985). As Davis points out, both the Louisiana and the United States Supreme Courts "saw
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of the black and the larger civil rights communities with the dominant political powers in policing rigid adherence to the hypodescent rule constrains
most civil rights jurisprudence, leaving the complex way race operates in
173
this country underexposed and unremedied. Thus, the black and the larger
civil rights communities must be willing to reject their rigidly monolithic
approach to race when arguing for meaningful racial justice.
Howard Winant writes that the creation of a racial democracy involves
174
the democratization of racial identity. He advocated open discussion about
the commonalities and differences that exist between and among distinct
175
racialized groups. Black identity in the United States is an amalgamation of
cultures from distinct African origins, as well as from more contemporary
Afro-Carribean and Afro-Latina/a cultures. The fundamental points of
commonality between these different groups with African ancestry are the
Atlantic slave trade experience and the dominant society's collective antagonism toward persons of African descent-what Lisa lkemoto characterizes
. o f wh'1te supremacy. 176
as the master narrat1ve
It is possible that in the next century racial attitudes toward black
people will soften, and legal notions about who is black will be modified. The
increase in interracial marriage and the numbers of multiracial individuals
177
may cause a blurring of traditional racial boundaries. Critics of affirmative
action tout the increase in interracial marriages as proof of how colorblind
the United States has become, 178 but as Robert Chang points out, "even with
no reason to disturb the application of the one-drop rule" in Phipps's case. DAVIS, supra note 21, at
11. The Louisiana Legislature, responding to the unfavorable publicity, repealed the statute in 1983
after the Phipps trial court decision. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:267, repealed by Acts 1983, No.
441, § 1. For a discussion of Louisiana's efforts to codify racial classifications, see Kenneth A.
Davis, Racial Designation in Louisiana: One Drop of Black Blood Makes a Negro!, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 199 (1976); and Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J. Como!, Codifying Caste:
Louisiana's Racial Classification Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255, 279
(1983 ).
173.
For a discussion of this point in the context of class distinctions within the black community, see Roy L. Brooks, Race as an Under-Inclusive and Over-Inclusive Concept, 1 AFR.-AM. L. &
POL'YREP. 9, 26 (1994).
174.
See WINANT, supra note 9, at 53.
175.
See id.
176.
See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean
American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993) (discussing
how "master narrative" of white supremacy constructs racial conflict).
177.
See Michael Lind, The Beige and the Black, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, § 6 (Magazine),
at 38 (arguing that interracial marriages, rather than blurring racial lines, may replace the traditional
black-white division with a new division between beige and black).
178.
See, e.g., Douglas]. Besharov & Timothy S. Sullivan, One Flesh: America Is Experiencing an
Unprecedented Increase in Black-White Intermarriage, NEW DEMOCRAT, july-Aug. 1996, at 19, 19-21;
Ben Wattenberg, In the Realm of Race, the Trend Is Blend, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 29, 1996, at 27A
(discussing the increase in out-marriages for Asians and Latinas/os, and even touting an increase
for blacks).
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the increased rate of white interracial marriage, in 198 7, twenty years after
Loving v. Virginia, 99 percent of white Americans were married to other
179
whites."
As the century ends, the rate of interracial marriage for blacks,
especially black women, has not changed significantly.
The unwillingness of whites to marry outside their recognized racial or
180
ethnic group signals the degree of perceived social and cultural difference.
Richard Alba points out that black Americans represent the "extreme
case," with the lowest rate of interracial marriage of any group; the increase
in black interracial marriage, 10 percent for black men and 4 percent for
black women, is strikingly low when compared with the intermarriage rate
for Asian Americans (approximately 66 percent), Hispanics (70 percent),
181
and Native Americans (50 percent).
Thus, perceived social and cultural
differences between blacks and other groups are still great, although changing
slowly. Given the resistance of nonblacks to interracial marriage with blacks,
any possible blurring of racial boundaries for persons of African descent may
result in a reformulation of antiblack discrimination directed against those
people who look most stereotypically black-dark-skinned people with
182
non-European features -without regard to racial classification.
CONCLUSION

No matter how problematic recognition of interracial colorism claims
may be, they will be advanced in the next century. The press by both white
parents and their biracial children for government recognition of biracial,
multiracial, or multiethnic designation by the United States Census Bureau
suggests that in some states, at least, traditional notions of race will become
less important in the near future. Writers for a news magazine discussing the
movement by biracial children for formal recognition by the Census Bureau
ask whether a biracial or multiracial category would "give lighter-skinned
183
people a further leg up the American socialladder?" They note that "[s)kin
184
color in the black community is still very much an issue." These writers,
179.
RobertS. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the Family, and the Dream that Is
America, 23 HASTINGS CON ST. L.Q. 1115, 1124 (1996) (citation omitted).
"A high rate of intermarriage signals that individuals of putatively different ethnic back180.
grounds no longer perceive social and cultural differences significant enough to create a barrier to
a long-term union." Richard D. Alba, Assimilation's Quiet Tide, 119 PUB. INTEREST 3, 13 (1995).
See id. at 16-17.
181.
To a lesser extent the same type of discrimination could be directed toward other multi182.
and biracial individuals with dark skin and non-European features. A fuller discussion of this form of
colorism is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
183.
Connie Leslie et al., The Loving Generation: Biracial Children Seek Their Own Place,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 72.
184.
ld.
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however, ignore the importance attributed to skin color by the dominant
political community in the United States and the broader implications of the
recognition of interracial colorism claims.
As the colorism cases suggest, the preference for light skin and the resulting economic consequences are not limited to people raced as black. A
national study of the socioeconomic impact of skin color and phenotype
among Mexican Americans conducted in the late 1980s made similar findings.
This study used two indicators of phenotype-skin color and physical
features. The researchers found that Mexican Americans whose physical
appearance is more European occupy a higher socioeconomic status than
Mexican Americans with the physical appearance of indigenous Native
185
Americans.
The study suggests that formal recognition of biracial and
multiracial individuals, while blurring the importance of race in employment
decisions, will not end discriminatory racial categorization.
The study's findings further confirm what the black community has
long suspected, that when hiring nonwhites, white employers prefer to hire
people of color who look most like whites. This preference for light skin
disproportionately affects persons with African ancestry, but it is not limited
to blacks. Thus, even if multiracial and biracial categories gain legal acceptance, and this acceptance results in the disruption of the racial category
of black, or African American, dark-skinned nonwhites will continue to experience forms of race-related discrimination not experienced by their lightskinned counterparts.
Almost fifteen years ago, Mari Matsuda wrote: "To an extent not yet
clear, color plays a significant role in American racism, with gradations in
color roughly paralleling graduations of sustained racism inflicted upon a
group." 186 In the twentieth century, Matsuda's description sounded very
much like an account of the kind of racism prevalent in Latin America. In the
twenty-first century her description may well apply to race relations in the
United States, and courts must be prepared to attack all forms of race-based
discrimination directed at persons of African descent.

185.
See, e.g., Carlos H. Arce eta!., Phenotype and Life Chances Among Chicanos, 9 HISPANIC].
BEHAV. SCI. 19,32 (1987); DouglasS. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Racial Identity and the Spatial
Assimilation of Mexicans in the United States, 21 Soc. SCI. RES. 235, 251-55 (1992) (noting that
white Mexicans are less residentially segregated than mestizo Mexicans).
186.
Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 335 n.SO (1987).
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